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Note 
THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE 
PORTION CAP RULE:  LAWFULLY REGULATING PUBLIC 
ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC 
KARA MARCELLO 
Faced with an obesity epidemic, on September 13, 2012, the New 
York City Board of Health became the first local administrative body to 
amend its health code to restrict the size of sugar-sweetened beverages 
sold in the food service establishments subject to its jurisdiction.  A 
legal challenge led by the American Beverage Association quickly 
followed.  
In March 2013, the New York County Supreme Court struck down 
the portion cap rule.  The challengers succeeded by arguing that the 
Board’s promulgation of the portion cap rule violated the separation of 
powers doctrine under the state constitution by usurping the power 
endowed to the New York City Council.  In addition, the court held that 
the portion cap rule was arbitrary and capricious.  The Appellate 
Division affirmed the decision in July 2013.  In October 2013, the New 
York Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. 
This Note defends the legality of the portion cap rule as a valid 
exercise of the Board of Health’s police power.  This Note elucidates 
the power of the Board, which is ultimately derived from the state, 
through an examination of municipal home rule, the city charter, 
commentary illustrating the intent of the state legislature, and case law.  
The decisions of the courts striking down the portion cap rule represent 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the quasi-legislative powers of the 
Board of Health to address the evolving public health needs of the 
people of New York City. 
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THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE 
PORTION CAP RULE:  LAWFULLY REGULATING PUBLIC 
ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC 
KARA MARCELLO* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 13, 2012, New York City became the first local 
government to amend its health code to cap the portions of sugar-
sweetened beverages1 sold at food service establishments.2  The New York 
City Board of Health passed the portion cap rule in response to the 
connection between consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages and the 
obesity3 epidemic plaguing the city.4  Public health laws, like the portion 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Boston University, B.A. magna 
cum laude 2010.  I would like to thank Professor Lindsay Wiley and Professor Loftus Becker for their 
thoughtful feedback.  I also wish to thank my twin Kate Marcello for her medical guidance and support.  
In addition, I would like to thank my friend Mike Samsel for calling my attention to the portion cap 
rule.  Last but not least, I would like to thank my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their 
extraordinary assistance. 
1 “Sugar-sweetened beverages,” or “SSBs,” are synonymous with sugary beverages when used in 
this Note.  They are commonly defined as “beverages that contain added, naturally derived caloric 
sweeteners such as sucrose (table sugar), high-fructose corn syrup, or fruit-juice concentrates, all of 
which have similar metabolic effects.”  Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic 
Benefits of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599 (2009). 
2 Bd. of Health, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§ 81.53) to Article 81 of the New York City 
Health Code, N.Y.C. DEP’T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE 1 
[hereinafter Notice of Adoption], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/2012
/notice-adoption-amend-article81.pdf.  
3 “For adults, overweight and obesity ranges are determined by using weight and height to 
calculate . . . the ‘body mass index’ (BMI).”  Defining Overweight and Obesity, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/defining.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2012).  For a majority of people, 
BMI “correlates with [the individual’s] amount of body fat.”  Id.  “An adult who has a BMI between 25 
and 29.9 is considered overweight,” while “[a]n adult who has a BMI of 30 or higher is considered 
obese.”  Id. 
4 “Epidemic” is conventionally used to refer to a nationwide problem and is defined as “affecting 
or tending to affect a disproportionately large number of individuals within a population, community, 
or region at the same time.”  Epidemic, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/epidemic (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).  In contrast, a “pandemic” is 
conventionally used to refer to a global problem and is defined as “occurring over a wide geographic 
area and affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population.”  Pandemic, M-W.COM, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pandemic (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); see also Barry M. 
Popkin et al., Global Nutrition Transition and the Pandemic of Obesity in Developing Countries, 70 
NUTRITION REVS. 3, 4 (2012) (estimating that, in 2008, 1.5 billion adults worldwide were considered 
overweight or obese).  For purposes of this Note, “epidemic” is used due to the Note’s focus on the 
obesity problem in the United States and New York City in particular.  
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cap rule, are the foundation of “legal preparedness for obesity prevention 
and control, because they . . . specify rights and responsibilities of private 
parties.”5  A growing body of research demonstrates the role such laws can 
play in decreasing the incidence of obesity.6 
Obesity is a national problem.  More than one-third of American 
adults, or 35.7%, are obese.7  The United States Surgeon General has 
labeled obesity prevention a “community responsibility.”8  A national goal 
set in 2000 to reduce the incidence of obesity in ten years has fallen far 
“out of reach.”9  The problem is projected to continue and proliferate, and a 
recent survey estimates that by 2015, “41% of American adults will be 
obese, and 24% of children and adolescents will be overweight or obese.”10  
If the law does not intervene, American children may live less healthy, 
shorter lives than the previous generation.11 
The obesity epidemic “is unlikely to yield to any single policy 
intervention, so it is important to pursue multiple opportunities to obtain 
incremental gains.”12  The portion cap rule reflects the hallmark of public 
health regulation as a “partial and incremental” response to the health 
threat posed by obesity.13  Targeting obesity by regulating the consumption 
of sugar-sweetened beverages is not a new innovation.14  Excise taxes on 
sugar-sweetened beverages have received growing consideration among 
                                                                                                                          
5 Judith A. Monroe et al., Legal Preparedness for Obesity Prevention and Control: A Framework 
for Action, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 16 (2009).  
6 Id.  It is the law that “shapes the situational and environmental influences that drive both dietary 
intake and physical activity,” while groups of stakeholders, including the government and the food 
industry, attempt to use the law to alter those influences.  Jess Alderman et al., Application of Law to 
the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90, 90 (2007). 
7 Adult Obesity Facts, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Aug. 16, 
2013). 
8 Alderman et al., supra note 6, at 90. 
9 Lainie Rutkow et al., Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling 
Laws and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 772 (2008). 
10 Id. (citing Youfa Wang & May A. Beydoun, The Obesity Epidemic in the United States—
Gender, Age, Socioeconomic, Racial/Ethnic, and Geographic Characteristics: A Systematic Review 
and Meta-Regression Analysis, 29 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 6, 22 (2007)).  
11 Michael Cardin et al., Preventing Obesity and Chronic Disease: Education vs. Regulation vs. 
Litigation, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 120, 120 (2007). 
12 Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1603. 
13 Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Local Bds. of Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents-Appellants at 12, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).  “Given the multi-factorial 
nature of threats to the public’s health, an incremental approach is not only legal, but often necessary.”  
Id. at 9. 
14 The portion cap rule is not the first regulation aimed at decreasing SSB consumption in New 
York City.  See Anne Barnhill & Katherine F. King, Evaluating Equity Critiques in Food Policy: The 
Case of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 301, 301 (2013) (noting the “recent, 
unsuccessful effort by New York State to exclude sweetened beverages from the items eligible for 
purchase in New York City with [the] Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program”). 
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policymakers, public health advocates, and the media.15  In 2008, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggested a federal excise tax on 
sugar-sweetened beverages to fund health care reform, which the CBO 
estimated would generate $50 billion in revenue between 2009 and 2018.16  
Although President Barack Obama entertained the idea of an excise tax on 
sugary beverages as a part of health care reform, the plan was “smothered” 
by Americans Against Food Taxes17 and other soft drink industry 
lobbyists.18 
Some health and policy advocates are specifically calling for local 
governments to take action to quell the obesity crisis.19  The New York 
City Board of Health answered the call by enacting the portion cap rule.  
Subsequently, the deep pockets of the American Beverage Association 
(ABA)20 were quick to challenge the legality of the rule by filing a petition 
to block and invalidate it with the New York County Supreme Court.21  On 
March 11, 2013, one day before the regulation was set to take effect, Judge 
Milton Tingling granted the ABA’s order to enjoin and permanently 
restrain the City from implementing or enforcing the portion cap rule.22  
The City appealed the next day.23  On July 30, 2013, the Appellate 
                                                                                                                          
15 Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Estimating the Potential of Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages to 
Reduce Consumption and Generate Revenue, 52 PREVENTIVE MED. 413, 413 (2011). 
16 Id. at 413–14. 
17 Membership includes “the soft drink makers, their suppliers, and such mass-marketers as 
McDonald’s and Domino’s Pizza.”  Tom Hamburger & Kim Geiger, Soda Tax Fizzles: Targeting 
Lawmakers and Nutritionists, Beverage Firms Put a Stopper in the Plan, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at 
A1.  
18 Id.  Although “public health advocates thought the tax would be a natural for congressional 
Democrats looking for revenue to fund expanded health insurance coverage,” the plan was not 
embraced by some White House staff, and “[a] key congressional committee, after initially seeming 
receptive, ended up refusing to consider it.”  Id. 
19 See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY, at S-1 (Lynn Parker et al. eds., 2009), 
available at http://www.nccor.org/downloads/downloads/Local%20Gov%27t%20Actions%20to%20Pr
event%20Childhood%20Obesity.pdf (“Local government leadership is critical to both reducing and 
preventing further increases in childhood obesity.  The places in which people live, work, study, and 
play have a strong influence on their ability to consume healthy foods and beverages and engage in 
regular physical activity.  Local governments make decisions every day that affect these 
environments.”). 
20 The ABA “is the trade association that represents America’s non-alcoholic beverage industry.”  
History, AM. BEVERAGE ASS’N, http://www.ameribev.org/about-aba/history/# (last visited Nov. 3, 
2013).  According to the ABA website, “[t]he non-alcoholic beverage industry . . . . has a direct 
economic impact of $141.22 billion.”  Id. 
21 See infra Part III.C. 
22 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). 
23 Notice of Appeal by Respondents at 1, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 
2013). 
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Division affirmed Judge Tingling’s ruling.24  A few days later, the City 
appealed the decision to the New York Court of Appeals.25  On October 
17, 2013, the New York Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case.26 
This Note will defend the New York City portion cap rule by arguing 
that the regulation is a legal exercise of the New York City Board of 
Health’s power and can ultimately withstand legal challenges by the 
fervent opposition.  Part II will stress the state of the nation’s obesity 
epidemic and the increased research on the connection between sugar-
sweetened beverage consumption and obesity and chronic illnesses.  Part 
III will provide an overview of the history of the New York City Board of 
Health and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.  Then, Part III will 
introduce the portion cap rule and detail the legal challenge currently being 
litigated.  Part IV will discuss the powers of the Board of Health by first 
providing an overview of municipal home rule and then analyzing the 
modern version of the New York City Charter and applicable case law.  
Part IV will also detail other recent Board of Health regulations aimed at 
curbing obesity.  Part V will support Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
assertion that “the judge is one-hundred percent wrong,”27 by illustrating 
that Judge Tingling’s and the Appellate Division’s rulings represent a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the powers of the Board of Health, as 
well as a misapplication of the Boreali framework and the standard of 
judicial review governing Board of Health rulemaking.  Part VI will 
address potential arguments concerning the Board of Health’s authority 
under the United States Constitution, specifically the Commerce Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause. 
II.  SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE CONSUMPTION 
AND THE NATION’S OBESITY EPIDEMIC 
The latest edition of the national dietary guidelines reveals that, across 
the country, “the prevalence of obesity has doubled and in some cases 
tripled between the 1970s and 2008.”28  New York is among the many 
                                                                                                                          
24 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
25 NYC to State Top Court: Review Big-Soda Ban Ruling, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/56693345-79/court-board-drinks-health.html.csp. 
26 Daniel Wiessner, New York Court to Hear Bloomberg’s Appeal to Restore Soda Ban, REUTERS 
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/us-nycsodaban-appeal-
idUSBRE99G0T620131017.  At the time of this Note’s publication, the date of the argument has not 
been set; the Appellant Reply Brief is not due until February 28, 2014.  Court of Appeals Court Docket, 
COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF N.Y., https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/courtpass/Docket.aspx (search 
by APL Number 2013-00291) (last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
27 Morning Joe (MSNBC television broadcast Mar. 13, 2013) (interview of N.Y.C. Mayor 
Bloomberg by Mika Brzezinski). 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR 
AMERICANS 9 (7th ed. 2010) [hereinafter DIETARY GUIDELINES], available at 
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states facing the challenges of obesity, as 2011 data from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) shows that approximately 24.5% of 
adult residents in New York are obese.29  According to one report, if it 
follows current trajectories, New York State’s obesity rate could reach 
50.9% by 2030.30  Strikingly, within the confines of New York City, 58% 
of adult residents are currently considered overweight or obese.31  Various 
medical studies emphasize that this obesity epidemic has a close 
relationship with sugary beverages—a common part of the American diet. 
A.  Medical Studies Link Sugar-Sweetened Beverages to Obesity and 
Related Health Problems 
The health problems most often associated with obesity include type 2 
diabetes,32 heart disease,33 and certain types of cancer,34 leading to the 
conclusion that “obesity can increase the risk of premature death.”35  
Despite the fact that “[d]ietary recommendations to prevent chronic 
diseases have always been controversial,”36 the correlation between sugary 
beverage consumption and obesity is gaining increased recognition,37 and 
“[t]he science base linking the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages 
to the risk of chronic diseases is clear.”38 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/DietaryGuidelines/2010/PolicyDoc/PolicyDoc.pdf. 
29 Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 7. 
30 Adult Obesity Rate in New York Could Reach 50.9 Percent by 2030, According to New Study, 
TR. FOR AM.’S HEALTH, http://tfah.org/reports/obesity2012/?stateid=NY (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
31 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2. 
32 Type 2 diabetes is a chronic illness characterized by high levels of sugar in the blood; an 
individual with type 2 diabetes is insulin resistant, with the fat, liver, and muscle cells responding 
incorrectly to insulin.  Health Guide: Type 2 Diabetes, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/type-2-diabetes/overview.html (last updated June 28, 
2011).  When blood sugar is not stored for energy, it causes sugar to build up in the blood; this 
condition is called hyperglycemia.  Id. 
33 “The well-documented adverse physiological and metabolic consequences of a high intake of 
refined carbohydrates such as sugar include the elevation of triglyceride levels and of blood pressure 
and the lowering of high-density lipoprotein cholesterol levels, which would be expected to increase 
the risk of coronary heart disease.”  Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1601. 
34 DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 20. 
35 Id. at 9. 
36 Joanne Slavin, Beverages and Body Weight: Challenges in the Evidence-Based Review Process 
of the Carbohydrate Subcommittee from the 2010 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, 70 
NUTRITION REVS. 111, 112 (2012). 
37 See Jason M. Fletcher et al., Are Soft Drink Taxes an Effective Mechanism for Reducing 
Obesity?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 655, 656 (2011) (“The rise in obesity has coincided with the 
rise in soft drink consumption.”); see also id. at 656–57 (asserting that “there are few compelling 
studies that can explicitly make a causal claim for a connection between soda consumption and 
obesity,” but nonetheless concluding that “the many potential links with a wide array of poor health 
outcomes suggest that there could be potential improvements in the health of the population from 
public policies that are effectively able to reduce soda consumption”). 
38 Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1604. 
 814 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:807 
A recently released study that spanned multiple decades and involved 
more than 33,000 Americans “has yielded the first clear proof that drinking 
sugary beverages interacts with genes that affect weight, amplifying a 
person’s risk of obesity beyond what it would be from heredity alone.”39  
The expansive genetic study arrived at the following conclusion: 
[T]he combined genetic effects on BMI and obesity risk 
among persons consuming one or more servings of sugar-
sweetened beverages per day were approximately twice as 
large as those among persons consuming less than one 
serving per month.  These data suggest that persons with 
greater consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may be 
more susceptible to genetic effects on adiposity.  Viewed 
differently, persons with a greater genetic predisposition to 
obesity appeared to be more susceptible to the deleterious 
effects of sugar-sweetened beverages on BMI.  Our findings 
further underscore the need to test interventions that reduce 
the intake of sugary drinks as a means of reducing the risk of 
obesity and related diseases.40 
In addition, researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health 
conducted a meta-analysis study that pooled data from eleven other studies 
and demonstrated that sugary beverage consumption “is associated with a 
clear and consistently greater risk of metabolic syndrome and type 2 
diabetes.”41  One portion of the study included 19,431 participants and 
5,803 cases of metabolic syndrome.42  Participants in the highest category 
of sugary beverage intake, drinking one to two beverages per day, were 
                                                                                                                          
39 Marilynn Marchione, Soda, Other Sugary Drinks More Firmly Tied to Obesity in New Studies, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/21/obesity-soda-sugary-
drinks_n_1904732.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.  For a full discussion of the study’s 
methodology, see Qibin Qi et al., Sugar Sweetened Beverages and Genetic Risk of Obesity, 367 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1387, 1388–89 (2012). 
40 Qi et al., supra note 39, at 1393.  The strengths of the study “include the prospective design, the 
large sample, use of repeated measures of sugar-sweetened beverage intake and BMI, comprehensive 
coverage of the established BMI-associated genetic factors, and replication of the results across three 
cohorts.”  Id. at 1395. 
41 Press Release, Harvard Sch. Pub. Health, Sodas and Other Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Linked 
to Increased Risk of Type 2 Diabetes, Metabolic Syndrome (Oct. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/sugar-sweetened-beverages-sodas-diabetes-
metabolic-syndrome/.  The study has been hailed as “the first meta-analysis to quantitatively review the 
evidence linking sugar-sweetened beverages with type 2 diabetes and metabolic syndrome.”  Id.  
Metabolic Syndrome “is the name for a group of risk factors that raises your risk for heart disease and 
other health problems, such as diabetes and stroke.”  What Is Metabolic Syndrome?, NAT’L HEART, 
LUNG, & BLOOD INST., http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/ms/ (last updated Nov. 03, 
2011).  If an individual has at least three of the five following risk factors, they are considered to have 
metabolic syndrome: abdominal obesity, a high triglyceride level, a low HDL cholesterol level, high 
blood pressure, or a high fasting blood sugar.  Id. 
42 Press Release, Harvard Sch. Pub. Health, supra note 41. 
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found to have a 20% greater risk of developing the syndrome than those in 
the lowest category of intake.43  Another portion of the study that followed 
310,819 participants and 15,043 cases of type 2 diabetes revealed that 
participants in the highest category of sugary beverage intake had a 26% 
greater risk of developing type 2 diabetes than participants in the lowest 
category of intake.44  The researchers determined that the risk of 
developing metabolic syndrome and type 2 diabetes through the 
consumption of sugary beverages results not only from the corresponding 
increase in weight, but also from “the high levels of rapidly absorbable 
carbohydrates in the form of added sugars, which are used to flavor these 
beverages.”45  Consequently, scholars and prominent organizations, such as 
the American Heart Association, are calling for dramatic reductions in 
consumption of sugary beverages.46  
B.  The Pervasiveness of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages in the American Diet 
Sugary beverages are “ubiquitous” and “sugar-and-calorie laden.”47  
Defined in the Dietary Guidelines as “soda, energy drinks, and sports 
drinks,” sugar-sweetened beverages comprise 36% of added sugar intake 
and rank as the highest source of added sugar in the American diet.48  
Relatedly, “soft drinks represent the largest category of energy intake 
among adults in the U.S.”49  Further, there is evidence that people do not 
limit caloric consumption from other foods after consuming sugary 
beverages.50  Fructose, an ingredient found in sugary beverages, may affect 
physiological processes and result in a feeling of starvation, effectively 
provoking more food consumption.51  These sugary beverages “are not 
necessary for survival, and an alternative (i.e., water) is available at little or 
no cost.”52  Thus, in the context of the obesity epidemic, soft drinks have 
                                                                                                                          
43 Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Risk of Metabolic Syndrome and Type 
2 Diabetes, 33 DIABETES CARE 2477, 2481 (2010). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 2482. 
46 Id. at 2477.   
47 Drink Water, Coffee, and Tea Instead of Sugary Beverages, 35 ENVTL. NUTRITION 3, 3 (2012).  
48 DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 28.  But see Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2–3 
(relying on a 2000 article published in the Journal of the American Dietetic Association to assert that 
sugary drinks, as “the largest source of added sugar in the average American’s diet, compris[e] nearly 
43% of added sugar intake”).  In addition, “sugar-sweetened fruit drinks,” defined as “fruit-flavored 
drinks, fruit juice drinks, and fruit punch,” comprise ten percent of calories from added sugar intake.  
DIETARY GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at 28 & n.54.   
49 Fletcher et al., supra note 37, at 656. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. (“[F]ructose may act to block the leptin signal pathway (where leptin is a protein 
hormone that plays a key role in regulating energy expenditure, appetite, and metabolism), resulting in 
a sense of starvation and driving further food intake.”). 
52 Brownell et al., supra note 1, at 1603. 
 816 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:807 
been labeled public enemy number one.53 
It is worthwhile to note that sugar-sweetened beverages have a 
significant impact on the health of America’s youth.  Soda is devoid of 
non-caloric nutrients and may, in the long run, contribute to malnutrition, 
especially in children.54  According to the CDC, sugary beverage 
consumption has risen one hundred percent among young adults since the 
1970s.55  These young Americans receive excess amounts of the daily-
recommended amounts of sugar from sugary beverages, which in turn 
contributes to the increasing rates of childhood obesity.56  This 
undoubtedly motivated health advocates and organizations to sign on to a 
letter to the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
which argued for the addition of health notices on sugary beverages to help 
implement the national dietary guidelines.57 
There is a definite connection between sugar-sweetened beverage 
consumption and obesity.  Sugar-sweetened beverages ultimately lead to 
weight gain due to their “high added sugar content, low satiety potential 
and incomplete compensatory reduction in energy intake at subsequent 
meals after consumption of liquid calories, leading to positive energy 
balance.”58  Although it is only one component of American dietary intake, 
sugar-sweetened beverage consumption deserves to be the subject of 
government regulation, given the research demonstrating its connection to 
the obesity epidemic and its ubiquity in the American diet. 
III.  THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF HEALTH:  FROM REGULATING TO 
CONTAIN A YELLOW FEVER OUTBREAK TO THE PORTION CAP RULE 
For over two hundred years, the New York City Board of Health has 
                                                                                                                          
53 Cardin et al., supra note 11, at 122.  The recommendation to decrease intake of sugary 
beverages has been championed by the Institute of Medicine, the American Heart Association, the 
Obesity Society, and many other organizations.  Sonia Caprio, Calories from Soft Drinks—Do They 
Matter?, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1463 (2012); see also Affidavit of Commissioner Thomas A. 
Farley at 4, N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2012) [hereinafter 
Affidavit of Commissioner Farley] (asserting that “research recently published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine on September 21, 2012 provided further confirmation that sugary drinks are 
associated with obesity”). 
54 Fletcher et al., supra note 37, at 656. 
55 Drink Water, Coffee, and Tea Instead of Sugary Beverages, supra note 47, at 3. 
56 Should the Federal Government Regulate Sugary Drinks?, HEALTH CARE EXPERTS BLOG 
(Nov. 1, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://healthcare.nationaljournal.com/2011/11/should-the-federal-
government.php. 
57 Organizations that signed the letter included the New York Department of Health, American 
Public Health Association, the California Center for Public Health Advocacy, the Boston Public Health 
Commission, the Philadelphia Department of Public Health, and the El Paso, Texas, Department of 
Health.  Health Warnings Urged for Soda & Other Sugary Drinks, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB. INT. (Jan. 3, 
2011), http://www.cspinet.org/new/201101031.html. 
58 Malik et al., supra note 43, at 2482. 
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responded to a number of infectious disease outbreaks.  More recently, the 
regulations promulgated by the Board of Health have responded to the 
incidence of chronic disease.  The promulgation of the portion cap rule 
evidences this latter trend.  
A.   History of the New York City Department of Health and the Board of 
Health 
The New York City Board of Health, considered the predecessor to the 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,59 was first established in 1805 
pursuant to an ordinance of the New York City Common Council.60  
Responding to the outbreak of yellow fever, the Common Council 
determined that the City needed more control over sanitation in order to 
curb the epidemic.61  In February 1866, the state legislature passed a public 
health law creating the Metropolitan Board of Health.62  Of the nine board 
members, three had to be physicians appointed by the governor, which 
took control of health matters out of the sole hands of politicians and gave 
some of it to health professionals.63  The law rendered the Metropolitan 
Board of Health the most powerful local public health body in the country, 
as it proceeded to respond to a cholera epidemic.64  In 1870, while New 
York City operated under the corrupt hold of Tammany Hall,65 a new city 
charter was adopted to revert control over health matters back to the City.66  
The charter formed a New York City Department of Health, which was 
overseen by a Board of Health.67  Instead of appointment by the governor, 
                                                                                                                          
59 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK 
CITY: 200 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP 1 (2005) [hereinafter PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS], 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/bicentennial/historical-booklet.pdf. 
60 Id. at 4. 
61 Id.  During “the next half-century, the Board generally took a reactive stance, meeting 
whenever an epidemic threatened the city.”  Id.   
62 Id. at 12. 
63 Id.; see New York City Board of Health, History: From Typhus to Trans Fat, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/about/boh.shtml (last updated Mar. 5, 2013) (“Everything changed 
in 1866, when the New York State Legislature expanded the Board and insulated it from political 
influence by setting aside seats for physicians and scientists.”).  The impetus for this change was the 
Tammany machine.  See PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS, supra note 59, at 12 (“In the late 
1850s, reformers began calling for the state legislature to establish an independent city health 
department that would not be controlled by the corrupt Tammany machine.  The first public health bill 
proposing such a department was introduced in 1859.”). 
64 PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS, supra note 59, at 15.  
65 See Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PAPERS PROJECT, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/tammany-hall.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) 
(“Tammany Hall was the name given to the Democratic political machine that dominated New York 
City politics from the mayoral victory of Fernando Wood in 1854 through the election of Fiorello 
LaGuardia in 1934.”). 
66 PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH: 200 YEARS, supra note 59, at 15–16. 
67 Id. at 16. 
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members were appointed by the mayor.68  Despite the fact that the Board 
of Health and the Health Department were headed by appointees of 
Tammany Hall, “the physicians and other experts in these divisions created 
a buttress against political influence.”69  At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the Health Department labored to address a tuberculosis epidemic 
and high childhood mortality rates,70 followed by the polio and influenza 
epidemics.71  By the mid-twentieth century, infectious diseases were 
largely controlled,72 while “[c]hronic disease, including diabetes, heart 
disease, high blood pressure, and cancer, became the next frontier for 
public health.”73  Since the 1950s, the Health Department has responded to 
a variety of public health concerns including the AIDS epidemic of the 
1980s,74 a resurgence of tuberculosis,75 the West Nile virus,76 and the 
public health effects of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.77  
Following voter approval, the Department of Health merged with the 
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Alcoholism 
Services in 2002, becoming the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
as it is known today.78  That same year, Thomas R. Frieden became the 
Commissioner of the Department.79  Commissioner Frieden initiated health 
surveys “to monitor the health of each community and increased the 
Department’s focus on programs that address chronic disease and health 
inequities.”80  Thomas Farley was appointed New York City Health 
Commissioner in May 2009,81 and has continued Frieden’s commitment to 
fighting chronic disease.  
1.  The Composition of the Board of Health 
The current New York City Board of Health in the City’s Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene comprises one chairperson who serves as   
                                                                                                                          
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 20, 23.  In 1900, the Board of Health passed an ordinance requiring mandatory reporting 
by physicians of all tuberculosis cases, which was the leading cause of death in New York City.  Id. at 
20.  
71 Id. at 26. 
72 Id. at 46.  
73 Id. at 49.  This new development in public health led the City Health Department in 1958 to 
establish a Health Research Council with a budget of $7 million to study chronic and infectious 
diseases.  Id. 
74 Id. at 52.  
75 Id. at 60.  
76 Id. at 64.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 63–64. 
79 Id. at 67. 
80 Id.  
81 Biography of Thomas Farley, M.D., M.P.H., NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/abo
ut/commish-bio.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
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the New York City Health Commissioner and ten members who are 
appointed by the mayor to serve for a term of six years without 
compensation.82  Five of the members must be doctors of medicine, with at 
least ten years’ experience in one of the following areas: clinical medicine, 
neurology, psychiatry, public health administration, or college level public 
health teaching.83  The other five members are not mandated to be doctors, 
but must meet certain education and experience requirements.84 
B.   The Portion Cap Rule and the New York City Board of Health’s 
Reasoning 
On September 13, 2012, the New York City Board of Health voted85 to 
enact Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s proposal to limit the size of sugar-
sweetened beverages sold in food service establishments86 to sixteen 
ounces or less.87  The portion cap rule amends article 81 of the New York 
City Health Code—which concerns regulations applicable to food 
preparation and food establishments as found in title 24 of the Rules of the 
City—by adding section 81.53.88  To fall within the purview of the portion 
                                                                                                                          
82 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 553. 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  These five members must hold at least a master’s degree in environmental, biological, 
veterinary, physical, or behavior health or science, or a related field, and must have at least ten years’ 
experience in that field.  Id.  The current Board consists of seven physicians, one Doctor of Public 
Health (Dr.P.H.), one Ph.D., and one M.P.H.  New York City Board of Health, Meet the Current 
Members, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/about/boh.shtml (last updated Mar. 5, 2013).  
Of the seven physicians, three also have an M.P.H.; one of those three members is also a Dr.P.H.  Id. 
85 The amendment and regulation passed with an affirmative vote by eight board members; one 
member abstained, one member was not present for the vote, and one member had recently retired.  
Michael M. Grynbaum, Health Panel Approves Restriction on Sale of Large Sugary Drinks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, at A24.  
86 The proposal defined food service establishments as those that are regulated by the Department 
of Health.  Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 1.  Article 81 of the Health Code:  
[A]pplies to all food service establishments and non-retail processing establishments 
where food, as defined in Article 71 of this Code, is prepared and offered for 
service, including but not limited to: mobile food vending units, mobile food 
vending commissaries, other food commissaries and shared or communal kitchens 
that are not inspected or regulated according to the State Agriculture and Markets 
Law, vending machines, temporary food service establishments, caterers, cafeterias, 
charitable organizations’ kitchens, social clubs, delicatessens, restaurants, and, bars.   
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.01 (2013). 
87 The vote to limit the size of sugar-sweetened beverages to sixteen ounces took place after a 
public hearing and a subsequent six-week public comment period, during which over 38,000 public 
comments were received, with 32,000 supporting the regulation.  Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, 
supra note 53, at 4, 21.  After the public comment period, “[n]o changes [were] made to the 
amendment in response to comments the Department received.  The language . . . [was] modified to 
clarify that the limitation extends to any cup or container used for a sugary drink or provided for a self-
service drink.”  Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 3. 
88 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
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cap rule, the sugar-sweetened beverage must be: (1) sweetened with sugar 
or another caloric sweetener by more than twenty-five calories per eight 
fluid ounces of beverage; (2) no more than fifty percent milk89 or milk 
substitute by volume; and (3) non-alcoholic.90  Carbonated and non-
carbonated beverages alike may be subject to the regulation,91 but one 
hundred percent fruit juices are exempt.92  Food service establishments and 
self-serve establishments cannot sell, offer, or provide a beverage meeting 
the definition of a sugar-sweetened beverage in a cup or container greater 
than sixteen ounces.93  Thus, cups or containers of sixteen fluid ounces or 
less are allowed.94  Under the rule, a fine of no more than $200 will be 
imposed per violation on those who do not follow the regulation;95 
however, fines were not set to go into effect until March 2013.96  
Included in the notice of adoption are the reasons for the Board of 
Health’s actions.  The phenomenon of individuals consuming their meals 
outside of the home means that they are increasingly exposed to oversized 
                                                                                                                          
89 Although the Health Department realized that the milk exception will leave beverages that are 
calorie dense or contain added sugar outside the reach of the regulation, the “exclusion for drinks 
containing a majority of dairy (by volume) balances the nutritional benefits for consumers.”  Affidavit 
of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20.  The Health Department elaborated: 
[T]he nutritional profile of these beverages differs dramatically from that of sugary 
drinks.  Sugary drinks generally contain no nutrients other than sugar, while milk 
and milk products contain calcium, vitamin D and potassium—3 of the 4 “nutrients 
of concern” often found deficient in the diets of Americans, according to the USDA.  
In addition, dairy products play an important role in a balanced, healthy diet, may 
have a protective effect against certain diseases and weight gain, and research shows 
they have a greater effect on satiety than sugary drinks. 
Id. 
90 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5.  “Alcoholic beverages are not subject to the Portion Cap 
Rule because service of these products is regulated by the State Liquor Authority.”  Affidavit of 
Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20. 
91 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5. 
92 Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20 (“Pure fruit juice is exempted as it has 
no added sugar and provides many of the same nutritional benefits as the fruit or vegetable from which 
it is derived.  Sugary drinks, in contrast, contain almost no nutrients other than sugar.”). 
93 This includes self-service cups.  Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5.  The portion cap is set at 
sixteen ounces because “[s]ixteen ounces balances health impact and feasibility for restaurants, 
indicating that complying with this regulation is possible and not overly burdensome.  Manufacturer-
sealed products such as cans are easily available to purchase.  Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra 
note 53, at 20. 
94 The media headlines on September 13, 2012, calling New York City’s action a “soda ban” are 
attributable more to the media’s use of hyperbole and flare for dramatization than to the facts of the 
regulation.  See, e.g., Michael Howard Saul, NYC Board of Health Passes “Soda Ban,” WALL ST. J. 
METROPOLIS BLOG (Sept. 13, 2012, 11:12 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/09/13/nyc-
board-of-health-passes-soda-ban/ (announcing in the headline a “soda ban” but conceding in the article 
that the law only implements a ban on the sale of large sugary drinks).  
95 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
96 See id. at 1, 3 (noting the amendment was adopted September 13, 2012, and would take effect 
six months from that date). 
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sugar-sweetened beverages.97  According to a community health survey98 
conducted by the Department of Health in 2010, fifty-eight percent of New 
York City adults are overweight or obese, while more than twenty percent 
of public school children in the city are obese.99  Diabetes, cardiovascular 
disease, and increased mortality are a few of the devastating health 
consequences of obesity100—which is taking the lives of six thousand New 
Yorkers every year.101  In the city, “chronic conditions [such as type 2 
diabetes, heart disease, and obesity] now cause a higher toll of preventable 
human suffering than even the most prevalent communicable diseases.  
Their burden also uses more of society’s resources.”102  
The Board also emphasized the connection between sugar-sweetened 
beverage consumption and the obesity epidemic: 
Americans consume 200–300 more calories daily than 30 
years ago, with the largest single increase due to sugary 
drinks.  Sugary drinks are also the largest source of added 
sugar in the average American’s diet, comprising nearly 43% 
of added sugar intake.  A 20 ounce sugary drink can contain 
the equivalent of 16 packets of sugar.  These drinks are 
associated with long-term weight gain among both adults and 
youth.103 
                                                                                                                          
97 Id. at 1. 
98 The survey’s methodology is described as the following: 
The New York City Community Health Survey (CHS) is a telephone survey 
conducted annually by the DOHMH, Division of Epidemiology, Bureau of 
Epidemiology Services.  CHS provides robust data on the health of New Yorkers, 
including neighborhood, borough and citywide estimates on a broad range of 
chronic diseases and behavioral risk factors. . . . The survey results are analyzed and 
disseminated in order to influence health program decisions, to increase the 
understanding of the relationship between health behavior and health status, and to 
support health policy positions. 
Survey Data on the Health of New Yorkers, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/data/survey.
shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). 
99 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2.   
100 See Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 3 (“Obesity is a risk factor for many 
debilitating and often fatal chronic diseases and health conditions, including heart disease, cancer, 
stroke, osteoarthritis, hypertension, gall bladder disease and type 2 diabetes.  Adults who are obese are 
almost twice as likely to develop diabetes as those who are overweight and almost three times as likely 
to develop it as those who are at a healthy weight.”). 
101 Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Deputy Mayor Gibbs, Health 
Commissioner Farley and Brice Ratner Announce Barclays Center Will Voluntarily Adopt Regulations 
to Limit Size of Sugary Beverages (Sept. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?page
ID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom
%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr326-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1. 
102 Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 4–5. 
103 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2. 
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Alarmingly, a 2010 community health survey showed that 30% of New 
York adults drink one or more sugary beverage per day.104  And the figure 
is “much higher in minority and low-income communities.”105  The rate of 
consumption among the city’s youth is also very concerning.  In 2009, 
26% of public school students consumed two or more sugar-sweetened 
beverages per day, with 44% of children aged six to twelve years old 
consuming more than one per day.106  The Board of Health noted its 
particular concern with the portion sizes available to consumers and the 
effect such portions have on consumption: 
The trend toward larger portion sizes has occurred in parallel 
with increases in the prevalence of obesity and people being 
overweight.  Serving sizes of manufacturer-packaged 
carbonated soft drinks have exploded—the original Coca-
Cola bottle size was 6.5 fluid ounces, which is significantly 
smaller than the vast majority of sizes for sale today.  
Fountain drink portions at restaurants are also growing—
beverage portion sizes at McDonald’s have increased 457% 
since 1955, from 7 fluid ounces to 32 fluid ounces.  Some 
restaurants in New York City offer individual drink sizes up 
to 64 fluid ounces.  A sugary drink of this size contains 780 
calories and 54 teaspoons of sugar, and no nutrients.  Larger 
portions lead to increased consumption and calorie intake.  
When people are given larger portions they unknowingly 
consume more and do not experience an increased sense of 
satiety.107 
The incidence of obesity in the City in combination with the 
trend toward larger drink portions and increased consumption serve 
as the foundation for the Board’s reasoning behind adoption of the 
portion cap rule. 
C.  The American Beverage Association’s Legal Challenge to the Portion 
Cap Rule 
The American Beverage Association (ABA) filed a verified petition 
with the New York County Supreme Court on October 11, 2012, seeking to 
enjoin and permanently restrain the Department of Health and the Board of 
                                                                                                                          
104 Id.  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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Health from enforcing the regulation, and to invalidate it.108  In the 
alternative, the ABA sought to declare the provisions of the New York 
City Charter granting the Board of Health its rulemaking and regulatory 
powers unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine 
under the state constitution,109 or else to declare the regulation unlawfully 
arbitrary and capricious.110   
On March 11, 2013, Judge Tingling granted the order to enjoin and 
permanently restrain the City from implementing or enforcing the 
regulation.111  The ABA succeeded in arguing that, by promulgating the 
regulation and circumventing the City Council, the Board “exceeded [its] 
authority and impermissibly trespassed on legislative jurisdiction.”112  The 
ABA specifically pointed to the four-factor analysis set out in Boreali v. 
Axelrod113 as the standard for determining when a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine under the state constitution has been 
committed.114  Judge Tingling found that three of the four factors supported 
granting the ABA’s motion, concluding the regulation was illegally 
promulgated in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.115  In 
addition, Judge Tingling assessed the reasonableness of the regulation and 
whether it was arbitrary and capricious.116  Although acknowledging the 
regulation’s reasonableness, he concluded that the “loopholes in [the] Rule 
effectively defeat [its] stated purpose,” and therefore concluded that the 
regulation was “fraught with arbitrary and capricious consequences.”117   
                                                                                                                          
108 Notice of Verified Petition at 1–2, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce 
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 11, 2012). 
109 Id. at 2.  The separation of powers doctrine is “implied by the separate grants of power to each 
of the coordinate branches of government.”  Clark v. Cuomo, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1985); see 
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the senate and 
assembly.”); see also Jennifer Weiss, Soda Ban Challenge Has Its Day in Court, WALL ST. J. 
METROPOLIS BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2013/01/23/soda-ban-
challenge-has-its-day-in-court/ (asserting that under the separation of powers argument, “lawyers for 
business groups said the Bloomberg Administration didn’t have the authority to push the regulations 
through without City Council approval”). 
110 Notice of Verified Petition, supra note 108, at 2.  
111 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20. 
112 Id. at *6. 
113 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1355–56 (N.Y. 1987). 
114 Notice of Verified Petition, supra note 108, at 29–31. 
115 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *8–18, *20. 
116 Id. at *20.   
117 Id. at *34.  Judge Tingling found it to be arbitrary and capricious: 
[B]ecause it applies to some but not all food establishments in the City, it excludes 
other beverages that have significantly higher concentrations of sugar sweeteners 
and/or calories on suspect grounds, and the loopholes inherent in the Rule, including 
but not limited to no limitations on re-fills, defeat and/or serve to gut the purpose of 
the Rule. 
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The City appealed the decision the next day.118  The Appellate 
Division affirmed Judge Tingling’s ruling, finding that “all four Boreali 
factors indicat[ed] . . . the usurpation of legitimate legislative functions.”119  
Therefore, the court held that the Board of Health violated the separation 
of powers doctrine.120  The Appellate Division did not find it necessary to 
address whether the portion cap rule was also arbitrary and capricious.121 
IV.  THE POWER OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH 
TO AMEND THE HEALTH CODE 
A.  An Overview of Municipal Home Rule 
The power of local governments has evolved over time.  In 1907, the 
Supreme Court, declared in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh122 that 
“[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the 
State as may be entrusted to them.”123  Thus, the “State . . . at its pleasure, 
may modify or withdraw all such [municipal] powers[,] . . . repeal the 
charter and destroy the corporation.”124  In a similar vein, Iowa Supreme 
Court Chief Justice John Dillon, in what has been branded “Dillon’s 
Rule,”125 declared that: 
[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the 
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in 
express words; second, those necessarily implied or 
necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, 
those absolutely essential to the declared objects and 
purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but 
indispensable.126 
                                                                                                                          
Id. 
118 Notice of Appeal by Respondents, supra note 23.  
119 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
120 Id. at 16. 
121 Id.  
122 207 U.S. 161 (1907).   
123 Id. at 178.  The Court upheld the constitutionality of an act of the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly authorizing the consolidation of Pittsburgh and Allegheny.  Id. at 174, 181.  A majority of 
the voters living in the two cities collectively voted for the consolidation, but the majority of voters in 
the smaller city of Allegheny voted against it.  Id. at 174–75. 
124 Id. at 178–79. 
125 See Richard Shattuck, A Cry for Reform in Construing Washington Municipal Corporation 
Statutes—Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 59 WASH. L. REV. 653, 655 
(1984) (acknowledging that the Washington Supreme Court had “adopted the narrow, nineteenth-
century approach to municipal corporation powers summarized by ‘Dillon’s Rule’”). 
126 Merriam v. Moody’s Ex’rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868); see also GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., 
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Under either formulation, it is clear that municipalities have no inherent 
power. 
Since Hunter and Dillon’s declarations, states have granted 
municipalities certain powers through legislation or state constitutional 
amendments to reform the legal relationship between states and 
municipalities, most notably through the home rule movement.127  Home 
rule is a concept of municipal autonomy and self-government under which 
“the state grants . . . powers to the citizens of a local area to structure, 
organize, and empower their own local government.”128  Although home 
rule in relation to Dillon’s Rule has been described as “a competing model 
of municipal governance,”129 it may in any given jurisdiction be as limiting 
as Dillon’s Rule.130 
In New York, municipal home rule is a long-standing constitutional 
principle.131  The home rule movement in New York State manifested as a 
concerted effort to provide municipalities with autonomy over local affairs 
and freedom from state legislative interference.132  Initially, and as a result 
of the Constitutional Convention of 1894, a provision was added to the 
state constitution granting cities the power to veto special legislative 
enactments that related to their property, affairs, or government.133  The 
Home Rule Amendment of 1924, i.e., article XII of the state constitution, 
                                                                                                                          
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 139 (5th ed. 2010) (presenting an excerpt from John Dillon’s 
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations section 237).  
127 See FRUG ET AL., supra note 126, at 158 (asserting that the home rule movement was the most 
important political effort aimed at restructuring the legal relationship between states and cities). 
128 Louis V. Csoka, The Dream of Greater Municipal Autonomy: Should the Legislature or the 
Courts Modify Dillon’s Rule, a Common Law Restraint on Municipal Power?, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 194, 
201 (2007). 
129 Id.  
130 See, e.g., McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834, 838, 840 (Md. 1988) (holding that a 
Montgomery county ordinance that created a private cause of action against abusive employment 
practices encroached on an area that was a statewide problem and went above the Maryland 
constitution’s grant to municipalities to have the full power to enact local laws). 
131 See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. 1989) (declaring that 
“[m]unicipal home rule in this State has been a matter of constitutional principle for nearly a century”).  
Despite that fact, “[h]ow constitutional home rule can be reconciled with the Hunter principle is an 
enduring puzzle in American local government law. . . . [O]bservers struggle to make sense of this 
seeming contradiction between the idea of local governments as supplicants and the idea of these 
governments as governance partners.”  Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home 
Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2009). 
132 Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1966). 
133 11 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2–3 (1938) [hereinafter PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE].  That 
provision of article XII became known as the “suspensory veto,” and divided the cities of the state into 
three classes depending on size.  Joseph L. Weiner, Municipal Home Rule in New York, 37 COLUM. L. 
REV. 557, 560 (1937).  Any act of the state legislature relating to the property, affairs, or government of 
cities and which did not affect all of the cities in one of the classes had to be submitted to the mayors of 
the cities affected for their acceptance or rejection; “[t]he consequence of rejection was merely that a 
second passage by the State Legislature was necessary to make the law effective.”  Id.  
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replaced the 1894 provision and added a “far more extensive definition of 
the power of cities to rule themselves, retaining only the phrase property, 
affairs or government.”134  The scope of a city’s power over its “property, 
affairs or government” was subjected to limited and vague judicial 
interpretation.135 
Under the “emergency clause” of the Home Rule Amendment of 1924, 
the state legislature was allowed “on receipt of an emergency message 
from the Governor to pass, by two-thirds majority vote, laws relating to the 
‘property, affairs, or government’ of cities, which are special in terms or 
effect.”136  An “emergency” did not necessitate invocation of the 
emergency clause.137  The courts have long acknowledged home rule as 
empowering the localities of the state.138  Although the New York Court of 
Appeals acknowledged under the home rule provision of the constitution 
that the state legislature was no longer the only lawmaking body, the court 
also asserted that “[t]here is no constitutional provision that the legislative 
body for passing ordinances or laws of a city shall rest in an assembly or a 
board of alderman or any other body.”139 
In 1964, the New York State Legislature’s “home rule package” went 
into effect, which included provisions of article IX of the state constitution 
and such statutes as the Municipal Home Rule Law and the Statute of 
Local Governments.140  The Municipal Home Rule Law served to 
implement article IX of the constitution.141  Home rule in New York 
consists of dual assertions of local government power through “limitations 
on State intrusion into matters of local concern and affirmative grants of 
power to local governments.”142  Under the New York Constitution article 
IX, local governments retain the powers granted in the Statute of Local 
Governments and the general laws of the state, as well as provision of the 
                                                                                                                          
134 PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE, supra note 133, at 3. 
135 Id. at 5. 
136 Id. 
137 See id. at 6 (acknowledging that “[m]ost of the emergency laws [dealt] largely with charter 
amendments of often trifling concern” and other non-emergencies). 
138 In 1936, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that “the Home Rule provision of the 
Constitution . . . has restricted the legislative powers of the Senate and the Assembly, and has vested 
power in cities.”  Mooney v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. 1936).  
139 Id. 
140 Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. 1989).   
141 DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 189 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that the law 
“specifically gives a municipality, such as the City of New York, the power to enact local laws for the 
protection and enhancement of its physical and visual environment and for the government, protection, 
order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
142 Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 348; see also James D. Cole, Local Authority to Supersede State 
Statutes, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1991, at 34, 34 (“Under Article IX of the State Constitution, home rule in 
New York has two basic components.”). 
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state constitution.143  In addition, local governments “have power to adopt 
and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
constitution or any general law”144 that relates to “[t]he government, 
protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or 
property therein.”145  This power under the constitution reiterates the power 
under the Municipal Home Rule Law, and is the authority from which 
local governments derive their police power.146  The acknowledged 
purpose of article IX is to promote strong local government.147  Under the 
Statute of Local Governments, municipalities have “[t]he power to adopt, 
amend and repeal ordinances, resolutions, and rules and regulations in the 
exercise of its functions, powers and duties.”148 
Consistent with the past constitutional home rule amendment, the state 
legislature may enact either general laws,149 which concern the property, 
affairs or government of localities, or special laws, which can be passed 
only if one of two stated conditions exist.150  The Municipal Home Rule 
Law empowers localities to adopt a new or revised city charter and 
provides the ways in which a charter commission may be appointed.151  
Ultimately, the charter must be submitted to the city’s electorate for a vote 
                                                                                                                          
143 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. § 2(c)(10). 
146 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) (McKinney 2012); see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
STATE, JAMES A. COON LOCAL GOVERNMENT TECHNICAL SERIES:                                                         
ADOPTING LOCAL LAWS IN NEW YORK STATE 7–8 (reprint 2012), available at 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Adopting_Local_Laws_in_New_York_State.pdf (“The police 
power has been defined generally as the power to regulate persons and property for the purpose of 
securing the public health, safety, welfare, comfort, peace and prosperity of the municipality . . . .”).  
147 See Town of Black Brook v. State, 362 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that to give 
effect to such a purpose, a municipality has standing to challenge an Act of the state legislature when 
the legislation is challenged as a violation of the home rule guarantees of article IX of the state 
constitution). 
148 N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10(1) (McKinney 2012). 
149 A general law is defined in the home rule context as “[a] state statute which in terms and in 
effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, 
all towns or all villages.”  Cole, supra note 142, at 34 n.6.  
150 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) (Lexis current through 2013).  This provision effectively means 
the “emergency” upheld in Mooney, which triggered the adoption of the modern New York City 
Charter in 1923, would not be permissible for New York City today.  See Eliot J. Kirshnitz, Recent 
Development, City of New York v. State of New York: The New York State Court of Appeals, in 
Declaring the Repeal of the Commuter Tax Unconstitutional, Strikes Another Blow Against 
Constitutional Home Rule in New York, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 935, 943 n.41 (2000) (describing how 
article IX of the New York Constitution provides that, “for cities besides New York City, the state may 
act in emergencies certified by the Governor and concurred in by two-thirds of the legislature”).   
151 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36; see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 146, at 27 
(“All cities in the State are governed by city charters which set forth the basic organization and 
administration of government for the city.  Cities are authorized to enact new or revised city charters 
and to amend existing charters.”). 
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and approved by a majority to become effective.152 
The home rule provisions under the New York Constitution grant local 
government broad police powers in enacting laws and regulations “relating 
to the welfare of its citizens.”153  However, two powerful restrictions are 
placed on the police power of localities.  First, the local government cannot 
adopt a law that is inconsistent with the general laws or constitution of the 
state.154  Second, the local government cannot exercise its police power 
within in an area of regulation that has been preempted by the state 
legislature.155 
B.  The History and Provisions of the New York City Home Rule Charter 
Empowering the Board of Health  
1.  Historical Context of the Adoption of the Modern City Charter 
“The purpose of a home rule charter is to render the city as nearly 
independent as possible from state interference.”156  A city charter is 
properly characterized as the “organic law of the city’s being.”157  
Although an older charter had been in place and the Board of Health had 
acted pursuant to it,158 voters of the city adopted the revised New York 
City Home Rule Charter, which provides the modern structure of the Board 
of Health, at the general election of 1937.159  In 1934, acting under the 
emergency clause of the Home Rule Amendment of 1924, the Governor of 
New York initiated the state legislature’s passage of the New York City 
Charter Revision Commission Act (the “Revision Act”).160  The Revision 
Act provided for the appointment of a commission by the mayor to prepare 
                                                                                                                          
152 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36 (5)(b), (d). 
153 N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 487 
U.S. 1, 1 (1988).  
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 Home Rule City Has Power to Enact Impact Fee Ordinance, MCQUILLIN MUN. L. REP., May 
2005, at 6, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, PROPOSED CHARTER FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND 
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION 6 (1936) [hereinafter N.Y.C. 
CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT]. 
158 See People v. Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. 1942) (“The Sanitary Code was formulated by 
the Board of Health of the city pursuant to authority conferred by the city charter.”); see also N.Y.C. 
CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 157, at 4 (“The Greater New York [City] Charter 
was enacted in 1897 and revised in 1901.  It was not itself a complete compilation of the law affecting 
the city.  No such compilation has been made since the Consolidation Act was adopted in 1882.”  
(citations omitted)). 
159 The Charter became effective January 1, 1938.  In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 92 N.E.2d 
49, 51 (N.Y. 1950); N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM., NEW YORK CITY 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 5 (1938) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION COMM. REPORT]. 
160 Murray Seasongood, The New York City Charter, 51 HARV. L. REV. 948, 948 (1938) (book 
review). 
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a new city charter, which would become effective upon approval by the 
electorate.161  As one commentator observed, “The new charter of the City 
of New York differs from ordinary home rule charters . . . [since] it was 
necessary to have the State Legislature initiate the charter-making 
machinery, because the municipal assembly was unwilling to do so.”162 
The revised charter was proposed only after public participation.163  In 
its 1936 report, the City Revision Commission noted its concern with the 
disordered organization of the laws governing the City.164  For instance, the 
provisions of the old charter included authority not given to the City within 
the home rule power; many of these offending provisions were removed to 
create “a short-form charter, as contemplated by the [state] Legislature, 
setting forth the structure of the city government and the manner in which 
it is to operate.”165  The Commission thought it wise “to limit the contents 
of the charter itself, so far as practicable, to matters subject to local action 
under the home rule power.”166   
Another concern of the City Charter Revision Commission was the 
manner in which it was formed under the state legislature’s Revision Act—
whose creation was prompted by a declaration of an emergency by the 
governor.167  The Commission noted that this practice constituted a flagrant 
violation of “the home rule principle.”168  Specifically, the Commission 
                                                                                                                          
161 Id. at 948–49. 
162 Weiner, supra note 133, at 572. 
163 See N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 157, at 2 (“At the outset of its 
work the Commission afforded to the people of the city an opportunity to express their views on charter 
revision in writing and at public hearings publicly advertised and held during February, 1935, and 
thereafter commenced its investigation and consideration of the existing structure of the government of 
the city and its administrative processes.”).  The Commission also met frequently with experts qualified 
to discuss the problems of government and administration.  Id.  In April 1936, the Commission released 
the draft of the proposed charter and preliminary report.  Id.  Subsequent hearings were held on the 
proposed charter in all five boroughs to give the public ample opportunity to participate.  Id. at 3. 
164 See id. at 5 (“In the period of more than half a century which has elapsed . . . the laws relating 
to the City of New York have grown haphazard in an overwhelming mass of statutes without any 
system or arrangement.  In this disorderly growth conflicts and inconsistencies have multiplied . . . so 
that it is a matter of the greatest difficulty today to ascertain the law on any particular question affecting 
the government of the city.  Neither the Charter of 1897 nor the revision of 1901 now in force 
attempted to bring order out of this confusion.”).  Due to this confusion, the State legislature passed a 
law in 1936 establishing a Board of Statutory Consolidation in order to consolidate “all the living law 
of the city in a complete codification, and . . . to prepare an administrative code in harmony with the 
provisions of the charter so that when the code is completed the charter and the code will contain all the 
law relating to the city.”  Id. at 5–6.  The Board of Consolidation consisted of the “Mayor, the 
Comptroller, the President of the Board of Aldermen and the Corporation Counsel.”  Id. at 5.  It is fair 
to say that at the time of the adoption of the new City Charter, the laws and administrative code 
underwent a complete overhaul.  
165 Id. at 6.  
166 Id.  
167 See id. at 41–42 (noting that the Charter “should [now] be far less open to impairment by state 
legislation”).  
168 Id.  The Commission acknowledged that the Home Rule Amendment strived to prevent 
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hoped that “the new short-form charter . . . [would] be less subject to 
[state] legislative interference and [would] stimulate the exercise of the 
home rule power in the City of New York.”169  With the hope of achieving 
this end, the new charter purposely only pertained to “matters directly 
affecting the property, government and affairs of the city.”170  
The State also acknowledged the need to enable New York City to deal 
with its own matters: “[G]overnmental problems of the City of New York 
are peculiar to it.  Nowhere else in the state does one meet the same 
conditions.”171  At the time, New York City was the largest city in the 
world with a population of over seven million people, and it accounted for 
over half the individuals living in the state.172  In addition, the City also had 
to address the problems exacerbated by “a daily floating population of half 
a million people.”173  In particular, the Committee acknowledged the 
challenges to health and police services in the city.174 
According to the Constitutional Convention Committee of 1938: 
The New Charter was intended only to outline in skeleton 
form the agencies of the city government and their basic 
functions.  It does not purport to embody all of the provisions 
of law relating to the government of the city.  It provides the 
structural framework of the city government and is intended 
to set forth the organic law relating to the city.  It was 
intended that the details of administration be included in an 
administrative code.  Such a code was to reenact all 
provisions of law affecting the city which were consistent 
with the provisions of the New Charter.   
An analogy might be drawn in describing the relationship 
between the administrative code and the charter as on a par 
with the relationship between the statutory law and the 
constitution of a sovereign body, wherein those provisions 
which were intended to be flexible and to yield to changing 
conditions would be subject to easy amendment, while 
primary grants of powers and important limitations upon 
abuses of power would be contained in a body of law which 
would express fundamental principles and ideals of 
government.175 
                                                                                                                          
“charter tinkering” on the part of the state legislature.  Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 41.  
171 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT, supra note 159, at 2. 
172 PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE, supra note 133, at 1–2. 
173 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT supra note 159, at 2.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
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The State Constitutional Convention Committee envisioned the city 
administrative agencies serving a key role in promulgating regulations to 
address the peculiar problems of governance in the city.  The view of the 
city charter as a skeletal form paralleled the New York City Revision 
Commission’s object to create a short-form charter.176   
According to the State Committee, under the charter, “the Board of 
Health . . . appointed by the Mayor, has plenary powers in relation to the 
enactment of Sanitary Code provisions.  It may legislate with the force and 
effect of law on any matter where the health and safety of the people are 
concerned.”177  At the same time, the State Constitutional Commission 
observed that, under the charter, the City Council “possesses the sole 
legislative power of the City.”178  The City Charter Revision Commission 
similarly noted that the City Council “is vested with the entire legislative 
power of the city . . . and local laws may be initiated only in the Council, 
which will alone constitute the local legislative body under the City Home 
Rule Law.”179  However, the City Revision Commission also declared: 
“The Board of Health exercises extraordinary police powers affecting the 
health of the city.  By its power to adopt a sanitary code the Board has 
plenary powers of legislation.”180  The report further noted: “The important 
legislative and semi-judicial powers of the Board of Health are recognized 
by giving to it a greater degree of independence through the lengthening of 
the terms of its members . . . and making them overlap and allowing 
removal only on charges. . . . [Certain] members must be doctors of 
medicine.”181 
2.  Provisions of Today’s Charter Empowering the Board of Health 
Under New York State law, localities are allowed to enact and enforce 
                                                                                                                          
176 See supra text accompanying notes 165 and 169 (noting the charter revision committee’s intent 
to create a short-form charter).  
177 N.Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT, supra note 159, at 14.  For 
purposes of this Note, “Sanitary Code” and “Health Code” are synonymous.  The Sanitary Code was 
the predecessor to the modern Health Code.  Paduano v. City of New York, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 218 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1966); see Metro. Ass’n of Private Day Sch., Inc. v. 
Baumgartner, 245 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (“The attacked sections stem from a 
complete revision of the former Sanitary Code, which the Board of Health found no longer kept pace 
with a health and welfare philosophy capable of reflecting the changing times and modes of city living.  
Accordingly, in order to properly fulfill its duties for the preservation of life, care and promotion of the 
public health of the City of New York, the Board of Health found that there was a need to revise the 
former Sanitary Code in existence since 1914 and bring into being a new health code. . . . After a 
period of three and one-half years, the present New York City Health Code was drafted as an annotated 
code with introductory notes, each section followed by the reviser’s notes containing the derivation of 
the section and other pertinent references.”). 
178 Id. at 7 
179 N.Y.C. CHARTER REVISION COMM’N REPORT, supra note 157, at 7. 
180 Id. at 38 (emphases added). 
181 Id. (emphasis added). 
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their own health codes, with the one caveat that the regulations of the local 
boards of health must at least comply with the minimum standards set forth 
under the State Sanitary Code.182  Accordingly, “[i]n granting the localities 
this power, the State has disclaimed any intention to preempt or supersede 
local health codes and their enforcement mechanisms.”183  In addition, 
New York City is specifically exempted from article three of the New 
York Public Health Laws, which provides for the organization of local 
boards of health.184 
The charter establishes the Board of Health within the City’s 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.185  The Board of Health has 
jurisdiction to add to, alter, and amend the health code pertaining to “all 
matters and subjects to which the power and authority of the department 
extends.”186  The New York City Health Code is codified in title twenty-
four of the Rules of the City of New York,187 and maintains the force and 
effect of law.188  The Board retains jurisdiction “to regulate all matters 
affecting health in the City of New York and to perform all those functions 
and operations performed by the city that relate to the health of the people 
of the city.”189  The Board of Health is specifically charged with the power 
to “supervise the reporting and control of communicable and chronic 
diseases and conditions hazardous to life and health.”190  The charter does 
not set forth an exhaustive list of matters over which the Board of Health’s 
jurisdiction extends.191  However, the charter specifies that the Board is 
empowered to “supervise and regulate the food and drug supply of the city 
and other businesses and activities affecting public health in the city, and 
ensure that such businesses and activities are conducted in a manner 
consistent with the public interest.”192  The Board of Health may confer 
                                                                                                                          
182 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 228(3) (McKinney 2012) (“Local laws, ordinances or regulations 
which comply with at least the minimum applicable standards set forth in the sanitary code shall be 
deemed not inconsistent with such code.”). 
183 People v. 230 W. 54th St. Corp., 516 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). 
184 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 312 (McKinney 2012) (“Unless otherwise expressly provided, 
the provisions of this article except section three hundred ten of this chapter shall not apply to the city 
of New York.”).  Under section 310, “[t]he [state] commissioner may annul or modify an order, 
regulation, by-law or ordinance of a local board of health concerning a matter which in his judgment 
affects the public health beyond the territory over which such local board of health has jurisdiction.”  
Id. § 310. 
185 See supra Part III.A (providing a historical overview of the Board of Health)  
186 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 558(c). 
187 Declaration of Thomas R. Frieden at 1–2, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509 
F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 1:08-cv-01000-RJH), [hereinafter Declaration of Frieden 2007]. 
188 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 558(a). 
189 Id. § 556. 
190 Id. § 556(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
191 Id. § 556. 
192 Id. § 556(c)(9); see Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 2 (“[O]versight of the 
City’s restaurants is a historical and core public health function that the Department has performed for 
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additional powers on the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene within 
the limits of the state constitution and laws, as well as the city charter 
itself.193  The amendments to the health code may be enforced by fine, 
penalty, forfeitures, and imprisonment.194  In addition, the Board of Health 
is given rulemaking authority under the charter, which sets out rulemaking 
procedures that provide for an opportunity for public notice and an 
opportunity for public comment.195 
C.  Case Law Interpreting the Powers of the Board of Health  
The New York State Legislature’s authority to grant local governments 
the ability to regulate local health affairs has long been upheld against 
challenges asserting that such delegation violates the separation of powers 
doctrine of the state constitution.196  The New York City Health Code is “a 
body of administrative provisions sanctioned by a time-honored exception 
to the principle that there is to be no transfer to the authority of the 
Legislature.”197  This exception to the separation of powers doctrine 
derives from the home rule provisions of the state constitution and the 
Municipal Home Rule Law, which vests power in the cities over their own 
affairs.198  Significantly, the New York Court of Appeals in Mooney v. 
                                                                                                                          
many decades.  The State of New York has recognized this by designating me, as the Commissioner of 
the Department, to be the permit-issuing official for food service establishments operating here.”).  
193 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 558(b). 
194 Id.  A violation of the health code is treated as a misdemeanor.  Id. § 558(e). 
195 Id. § 1043(a), (b)(1), (e). 
196 See People v. Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. 1942) (upholding the New York City Charter 
granting the Board of Health the ability to establish the Health Code, against a challenge that the state 
legislature, in granting the ability to establish such a charter, delegated to a local board legislative 
power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine under article III, section 1 of the state 
constitution); Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 107, 126 (N.Y. Com. Pl. 1866) (upholding the state 
statute creating the New York Metropolitan Board of Health against a constitutional challenge that the 
legislature was delegating away its legislative power, by acknowledging that the state legislature 
“constantly exercises the powers of conferring upon local bodies created for public purposes, the 
authority to make and to enforce by-laws or ordinances,” and specifically observing the tradition of 
those empowered public bodies “to make rules and regulations for the protection of the public health, 
which were enforced with the effect of law”); see also Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Separation of 
Powers—Delegation of Legislative Powers to Boards of Health, 20 HARV. L. REV. 147, 147 (1906) 
(“Except in the case of municipal corporations, the legislature cannot constitutionally delegate its 
lawmaking power to agents.  This rather vague rule has been liberally interpreted in favor of boards of 
health.  For example, a statute authorizing measures preventive of smallpox confers constitutional 
authority upon a board to compel vaccination during an epidemic.” (citations omitted)). 
197 Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d at 8. 
198 See Mooney v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. 1936) (asserting that the home rule provisions 
vest in localities “the power to adopt and amend local laws, not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
laws of the state, relating to many matters which are therein considered to be the property, affairs or 
government of the city”); see also People v. 230 W. 54th St. Corp., 516 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 1987) (“It has long been established that New York City has the police power to enact and enforce 
laws such as Section 558(e) of the NYC Charter for the protection, safety, health and well-being of 
persons and property within its control under Municipal Home Rule Law, Section 10(1)(ii)(a)(11) and 
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Cohen199 noted the freedom of municipalities to enact local laws, stating: 
“No limitation is here found upon the method by which these local laws 
shall be adopted, and no replica of the State Senate and Assembly is 
necessary.”200   
As the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, the “main business of 
safeguarding the public health has always of necessity been done by local 
boards.”201  The court has declared that: 
The deduction is clear from section 558 of the City Charter—
which empowers the Board of Health to legislate in the field 
of health generally . . . —that the [state] Legislature intended 
the Board of Health to be the sole legislative authority within 
the City of New York in the field of health regulations as 
long as those regulations were not inconsistent with or 
contrary to State laws dealing with the same subject 
matter.202   
Consequently, “[t]he power of the Board to enact provisions for the 
furtherance and protection of health has long been established as a 
constitutional exercise of power.”203  The Board of Health retains the 
power to “act in [a] legislative capacity under State legislative 
authority.”204  The police power granted to the Board from the state is 
broad, “limited only by the requirement that there be a reasonable 
relationship to the public health or welfare and that it not be exercised 
arbitrarily.”205 
In an illustrative case, Grossman v. Baumgartner,206 the regulation at 
issue amended the health code to prohibit tattooing in New York City207 
                                                                                                                          
(4)(a), (b) and Article IX, Section 2(c) of the NYS Constitution.”). 
199 4 N.E.2d 73. 
200 4 N.E.2d at 74. 
201 Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d at 8. 
202 Grossman v. Baumgartner, 218 N.E.2d 259, 263 (N.Y. 1966); see Schulman v. N.Y.C. Health 
& Hosp. Corp., 342 N.E.2d 501, 502 n.1 (N.Y. 1975) (citing to Grossman for the proposition that “the 
Board of Health has been recognized by the Legislature as the sole legislative authority in the field of 
health regulation in the City of New York”). 
203 Paduano v. City of New York, 257 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535–36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (concluding 
that a fluoridation regulation of the Board of Health was directed toward the “security of the life and 
health” of the residents of the City in order “to cope with the serious and growing public health 
problem of tooth decay and dental neglect,” and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Health), aff’d, 260 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965), aff’d, 218 N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1966). 
204 Id. at 538. 
205 Metro. Ass’n of Private Day Sch., Inc. v. Baumgartner, 245 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736–37 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1963). 
206 218 N.E.2d 259. 
207 The regulation allowed tattooing for a medical purpose and by a licensed physician or 
osteopath.  Grossman, 218 N.E.2d at 261.  The Appellate Division inaccurately asserted that the 
regulation at issue in Grossman only prohibited tattooing of a child under sixteen years old.  N.Y. 
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because evidence established a connection between tattooing and serum 
hepatitis.208  The plaintiffs, former owners of tattoo parlors, went out of 
business due to the regulation.209  The opposition to the regulation asserted 
an identical argument to the one made by the petitioners challenging the 
portion cap rule, arguing that the tattoo regulation was an unconstitutional 
exercise of legislative power in violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.210  The New York Court of Appeals in Grossman quickly 
disposed of this argument: 
As this court wrote in the Blanchard case, “Within limits that 
are to be measured by tradition, the State may commit to 
local governments the power to regulate local affairs. . . .  On 
that basis, the main business of safeguarding the public 
health has always of necessity been done by local boards or 
officers through sanitary by-laws or ordinances which have 
been accorded the force of law.”211 
Despite the mandate of the separation of powers doctrine that the 
“[l]egislature make the critical policy decisions, while the executive 
branch’s responsibility is to implement those policies,” the New York 
Court of Appeals “has always understood that the duties and powers of the 
legislative and executive branches cannot be neatly divided into isolated 
pockets.”212  Further, the court has “acknowledged that there need not be a 
specific and detailed legislative expression authorizing a particular 
executive act as long as ‘the basic policy decisions underlying the 
regulations have been made and articulated by the Legislature.’”213  Due to 
the inherent ambiguity of legislative inaction, failure on the part of the 
legislature to enact a law pertaining to the subject matter of a regulation or 
order by the executive branch is not inevitably indicative of legislative 
disapproval.214  The court views the mandate of the separation of powers 
                                                                                                                          
Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 
110 A.D. 3d 1, 13–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
208 Grossman, 218 N.E.2d at 262 (“A review of the evidence given by defendants’ witnesses 
thoroughly demonstrates the [regulation’s] compelling medical necessity . . . .”). 
209 Id. at 261. 
210 Id. at 262. 
211 Id. at 262–63 (quoting People v. Blanchard, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (N.Y. 1942)). 
212 Bourquin v. Cuomo, 652 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1995). 
213 Id. (quoting N.Y. Health Facilities Ass’n, Inc. v. Axelrod, 569 N.E.2d 860, 863 (N.Y. 1991)).  
Therefore, “[i]t is only when the Executive acts inconsistently with the Legislature, or usurps its 
prerogatives, that the doctrine of separation is violated.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Clark v. 
Cuomo, 486 N.E.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. 1985)). 
214 See id. at 175 (“[T]he Legislature considered but failed to enact a bill substantially similar to 
the provisions of the Executive Orders ultimately issued by the Governor. . . . [T]he plaintiffs argued 
that such failure should be taken as proof of hostile legislative intent.  As we [have] said . . . however, 
‘that proposed legislation similar to [the] Executive Order was not passed does not indicate legislative 
disapproval of the programs contemplated by the order.’” (quoting Clark, 486 N.E.2d at 798)).  
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doctrine from a commonsense perspective, demonstrating a “long-standing 
and steadfast refusal to construe the . . . doctrine in a vacuum.”215  Out of 
necessity, there will be overlap between the powers of the separate 
branches of government.216 
Under the city charter, the Board of Health is granted the discretionary 
power to amend or repeal the health code in order to meet the demands of 
changing public health needs.217  Recently, a regulation amending the 
health code by establishing a list of wild animals prohibited from the city 
was upheld against a challenge that the delegation of powers under the 
New York City Charter violated the separation of powers doctrine.218  The 
plaintiffs did not meet their burden in demonstrating that the delegation of 
powers to the Board violated the separation of powers doctrine, 
“particularly given the expertise of the Board of Health in areas of public 
health and medicine.”219  The plaintiffs also did not demonstrate that in 
promulgating the regulation, the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously or 
contrary to law.220  The court acknowledged that the Board of Health 
derived its power from sections 556 and 558 of the New York City 
Charter, and under “the police powers of the Executive Branch to control 
the harboring of animals, especially wild or dangerous animals.”221 
1.  Proper Judicial Review of a Board of Health Regulation 
A health code amendment promulgated pursuant to the Board of 
Health’s police power is afforded a presumption of constitutionality.222  
After establishing the legality to enact the amendment, the review by a 
court of law “is limited to whether . . . [the] determination is rationally 
based, i.e., whether it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.”223  An 
amendment of the health code will be upheld if there is “compelling 
medical necessity” supporting the amendment or when it cannot be said 
that the Board, given its expertise, promulgated an unreasonable 
                                                                                                                          
215 Id. at 173. 
216 See id. (citing to the overlap between the branches of government in a case concerning an 
Executive Order against a challenge that the Governor circumvented the state legislature).  
217 See N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 607–08 (N.Y. 1991) (observing 
that a similar Public Health Law granting the state Public Health Council (PHC) the discretion to 
“establish, and from time to time, amend and repeal sanitary regulations, to be known as the sanitary 
code of the state of New York,” reflects the flexibility granted to the PHC to adapt to conditions “in 
order to deal with changing public health concerns”). 
218 Glass v. City of New York, No. 121839/99, 2002 WL 1461895, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 
14, 2002). 
219 Id. at *2. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at *1. 
222 See Metro. Ass’n of Private Day Sch., Inc. v. Baumgartner, 245 N.Y.S.2d 733, 737 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1963) (“This presumption is of course rebuttable, but he who would rebut must show that there is 
no permissible interpretation of all the facts which justify the imposition of such police powers.”). 
223 N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 609 (N.Y. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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regulation, devoid of justification.224  The New York Court of Appeals has 
declared that “[t]he police power [of the Board] is exceedingly broad, and 
the courts will not substitute their judgment of a public health problem for 
that of eminently qualified physicians in the field of public health.”225 
D.  The Board of Health’s Commitment to Combating Obesity  
Increasingly, “[p]olicymakers, public health professionals, advocacy 
groups, and researchers . . . recognize law as a valuable tool for the 
prevention of chronic diseases and of obesity in particular.”226  This truth 
has been demonstrated by the regulatory actions of the New York City 
Board of Health, under former Commissioner Frieden and current 
Commissioner Farley.   
The Board of Health has responded to the childhood obesity epidemic 
in a number of ways.  In 2006, the Board adopted new requirements for the 
nutritional value of food and beverages served in group day care facilities 
licensed by the Department of Health.227  In January 2007, the Department 
of Health implemented a rule promulgated by the Board of Health 
“mandating that day care services provide at least sixty minutes of 
specified types of daily physical activity.”228 
In addition, in December 2005, the Board of Health amended the 
health code to require the reporting of blood sugar (Hemoglobin A1C) test 
results to the Department of Health in an attempt to curb diabetes.229  This 
was followed by the year of trans-fat regulation.230  At the beginning of 
                                                                                                                          
224 Grossman v. Baumgartner, 218 N.E.2d 259, 262 (N.Y. 1966). 
225 Id; see also N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons, 572 N.E.2d at 609 (“We cannot substitute our 
judgment for that of qualified experts in the field of public health unless their judgment is ‘without 
justification.’” (quoting Grossman, 218 N.E.2d at 262)). 
226 Monroe et al., supra note 5. 
227 Id. at 17.  Under the regulation, “[b]everages with added sweeteners, whether artificial or 
natural, shall not be provided to children.”  24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61(b)(1) (2013). 
228 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61; Monroe et al., supra note 5, at 17.  The rule also: 
[P]roscribed television, video, and “other visual recordings” for children younger 
than 2 years of age; restricted viewing to 60 minutes daily for older children; and 
limited viewing to “educational programs or programs that actively engage child 
movement.”  Additional requirements were approved in September 2008 for outdoor 
activity and play equipment. 
Id. (quoting 24 R.C.N.Y. § 47.61). 
229 Id. at 123–24.  Dr. Frieden, the Health Department Commissioner “is enthusiastic about the 
new program, hoping it will reduce the number of people in New York City with uncontrolled diabetes, 
particularly Type 2 diabetes.”  Id. at 121.  The records must include the patient’s name, date of birth, 
address, physician, and other information.  Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing 
Legal Boundaries, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121, 121 (2007). 
230 “[A]lso referred to as trans fatty acid or partially hydrogenated oil, [trans-fat] is created by 
adding hydrogen to vegetable oils, turning them into solid fats; trans-fat is used commercially primarily 
to extend shelf life and add taste to cooked foods.  This ‘bad’ fat contributes to heart disease and 
obesity.”  Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, It’s Not a Small World After All: Regulating Obesity Globally, 79 
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2006, a federal regulation promulgated by the FDA required inclusion of 
trans-fat content in the nutritional labels of packaged foods.231  Then, the 
New York City Board of Health amended the health code in December 
2006, mandating that artificial trans-fats be virtually removed from food 
served in the City’s restaurants.232 
Perhaps one of the most widely publicized initiatives of the Board of 
Health concerned the posting of calories on menus and menu boards in 
restaurants.  In a lawsuit challenging the regulation, the Board of Health 
stated that “calories are the single most important piece of nutritional 
information related to weight gain.”233  As Department of Health 
Commissioner Frieden explained, the Board promulgated the regulation 
“because the Board and Department are charged with the prevention and 
control not just of communicable diseases, but also of chronic diseases and 
their risk factors.  Calorie posting will allow New Yorkers to make the 
healthy choices needed to prevent or manage chronic diseases associated 
with obesity.”234  The regulation required all chain restaurants with fifteen 
or more establishments nationwide to display calorie content.235  The New 
York City menu labeling regulation set a trend for the nation,236 and the 
federal government eventually followed suit.  The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress in March 2010, promulgated a 
national nutritional disclosure regulation, requiring food establishments 
with twenty or more locations to disclose nutritional information regarding 
                                                                                                                          
MISS. L.J. 697, 699–700 (2010). 
231 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2006); Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 230, at 699. 
232 Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 230, at 700.  Specifically, under the regulation: 
No foods containing artificial trans fat . . . shall be stored, distributed, held for 
service, used in preparation of any menu item or served in any food service 
establishment or by any mobile food unit commissary, as defined in § 89.01 of this 
Code or successor provision, except food that is being served directly to patrons in a 
manufacturer’s original sealed package. 
24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.08(a).  “The Health Department followed the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
labeling regulations in permitting, however, service of foods that contain less than 0.5 grams of trans 
fat per serving.”  Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 230, at 700. 
233 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
234 Declaration of Frieden 2007, supra note 187, at 5.  
235 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.50(a)(1).  The Board’s first attempt at a menu labeling regulation only 
applied to those restaurants that voluntarily chose to make calorie content information available, and 
the court found the regulation expressly preempted by the Nutrition Labeling Education Act.  N.Y. State 
Rest. Ass’n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 363.  Not surprisingly, however, “[t]aking its cue from the district 
court’s opinion, on January 22, 2008, the New York City Board of Health repealed and modified the 
2006 regulation . . . .”  N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
236 Liza M. Escapa Lima, From the Big Apple to Big Ben: An Insight into Menu Labeling, 18 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (2011).  Following the regulation, “numerous menu labeling laws 
[were] implemented across the country.”  Id.  
 2013] THE NEW YORK CITY SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGE PORTION CAP RULE 839 
standard menu items.237   
To continue the City’s proactive approach in addressing the obesity 
epidemic and the chronic diseases associated with obesity, Mayor 
Bloomberg charged Linda Gibbs, Deputy Mayor of Health and Human 
Services, and Cas Holloway, Deputy Mayor of Operations, with 
assembling a multi-agency obesity task force.238  Convening in January 
2012, the task force was charged with recommending innovative and 
aggressive solutions to the obesity epidemic.239  The task force concluded 
that, second only to tobacco, obesity is a leading cause of preventable 
death and kills 5800 New York City residents every year.240  The task force 
found that fifty-eight percent of adults, or 3,437,000 individuals, were 
overweight or obese.241  According to its findings, “[s]ugary drinks are the 
leading items associated with excess intake of calories in adults” and such 
drinks “are now ubiquitous, calorie dense, cheap, served in large portion 
sizes and aggressively promoted” in the city.242  Likely due to the 
“ubiquity” of the beverages, the task force found sugary drinks to be the 
largest contributor to the average caloric intake increase of two hundred to 
three hundred calories per day over the last thirty years.243 
V.  AMENDING THE HEALTH CODE TO ENACT THE PORTION CAP RULE  
IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE BOARD’S POLICE POWER 
In his opinion, Judge Tingling ruled that the portion cap rule violated 
the separation of powers doctrine under Boreali and, further, was an 
arbitrary and capricious regulation.244  The Appellate Division affirmed 
that decision under the Boreali analysis without addressing whether the 
                                                                                                                          
237 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573–77 
(2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 343(q) (2012)).  Food establishments covered by the section 
must post calories next to the menu item, and the recommended daily caloric intake must be posted on 
the menu.  Escapa Lima, supra note 236, at 10.  On the issue of preemption, state and local 
governments cannot impose nutrition labeling requirements on restaurants and vending machines 
covered by the Act and accompanying rules that are not identical to federal requirements; but states and 
localities can, however, impose requirements on restaurants and vending machines not covered by the 
Act.  Questions and Answers on the New Nutrition Labeling Requirements, U.S. 
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm248731.htm (last 
updated Apr. 24, 2013); see also Escapa Lima, supra note 236, at 10 (“This federal law will preempt 
any state law regarding menu labeling . . . . supersed[ing] any local ordinance or regulation.”). 
238 CITY OF N.Y., REVERSING THE EPIDEMIC: THE NEW YORK CITY OBESITY TASK FORCE PLAN 
TO PREVENT AND CONTROL OBESITY 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/otf_report.pdf.  
239 Id.  
240 Id. at 4. 
241 Id.  
242 Id. at 5.  
243 Id. 
244 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). 
 840 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:807 
rule was arbitrary and capricious.245  Both courts arrived at erroneous 
conclusions based on their misunderstanding of the Board of Health’s 
police power and misapplied the Boreali standard.  In addition, Judge 
Tingling blatantly misapplied judicial review in his ruling that the portion 
cap rule was arbitrary and capricious. 
A.  The Relationship Between the Board of Health and City Council 
The power of the Board of Health is not merely grounded in 
tradition;246 it is grounded in law.  The state legislature conferred upon 
localities the ability to legislate and regulate to address local affairs, 
through municipal home rule.247  Under the current Municipal Home Rule 
Law, localities may adopt a home rule charter to codify their organic 
law.248  Municipalities derive this police power from the state,249 and as the 
New York Court of Appeals has acknowledged, the Board of Health has 
broad discretion in the exercise of its police power.250   
Under the charter, New York City’s municipal structure provides for a 
powerful Board of Health, charged with promulgating regulations to meet 
the health demands of the city.  The New York City Charter Revision 
Committee intended to vest a broad police power in the Board of Health to 
amend and alter the health code.  The observations of the State Convention 
Committee substantiate this intention.  Both committees, while 
acknowledging that the charter vested in the City Council the sole 
legislative power of the City, affirmed that the police power granted to the 
Board of Health ranks as a quasi-legislative plenary power.251  In the 
opinion of the state legislature, the power of the Board of Health neither 
impinges upon nor usurps the power of the City Council. 
Therefore, any argument that the Board of Health circumvented the 
                                                                                                                          
245 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 11–12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
246 See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *7 
(asserting that respondents relied on “the history of the New York Legislature’s grants of authority as 
well as the history of the City Charters [as] creat[ing] a quasi legislative body uniquely charged with 
enacting laws protecting the public health in New York City” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
247 See supra Part IV.A.  
248 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 153–64 and accompanying text (discussing the derivation of the municipal 
police power). 
250 See N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 607–08 (N.Y. 1991) (observing 
that a similar Public Health Law granting the state PHC the discretion to “establish, and from time to 
time, amend and repeal sanitary regulations, to be known as the sanitary code of the state of New 
York,” reflects the flexibility granted to the PHC to adapt to conditions “in order to deal with changing 
public health concerns” (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra text accompanying note 217 
(acknowledging the discretionary power of the Board of Health). 
251 See supra Part IV.B.1 (acknowledging the parallel assertions of the state constitutional 
convention committee and the city charter revision committee).  
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City Council by enacting the portion cap rule is illogical.  The Appellate 
Division inaccurately claimed that the Board “derives its power to establish 
rules and regulations directly and solely from . . . the City Council.”252  
Both the City Council and Board of Health are vested with their respective 
legislative powers by the state legislature.  The intent of the state 
legislature is controlling, and that intent was for the Board of Health to be 
the authority in the field of health regulation in the City.253  The New York 
Court of Appeals has noted that the powers of each body cannot be neatly 
separated, hence overlap is inevitable.254     
The fact that the city charter was adopted in response to the particular 
needs of the city clarifies that the distribution of power between the City 
Council and the Board of Health was deliberate.  As has been 
acknowledged recently, “[a]s part of New York City’s regulatory authority 
to protect the public health and safety, the City, through legislation enacted 
by the City Council and rulemaking promulgated by City agencies, passes 
laws and regulations to safeguard public health and safety in the City.”255  
As far back as the state legislature’s creation of the Metropolitan Board of 
Health, the Board ranked as a local body of experts in the area of public 
health, insulated from the political process.256  The Board specifically 
retains the authority to regulate the business and activities of food service 
establishments in a way that promotes the public interest.257  The Board 
does not regulate such establishments in the name of special interest.  The 
New York City Charter Committee particularly noted the independence 
granted to the members of the Board.258  Given the political influence of 
the food and beverage industry,259 it is unsurprising that the members of 
the Board of Health—appointed by the mayor and intentionally insulated 
from the political process—promulgated the portion cap rule rather than 
the City Council.  The Board of Health’s trend-setting calorie posting and 
trans-fat regulations may similarly be characterized as enactments that 
                                                                                                                          
252 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
253 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
254 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
255 Michelle Goldberg-Cahn, Federal Preemption of Public Health and Safety Rules, 18 CITY L. 
73, 73 (2012). 
256 See supra Part III.A (providing a historical overview of the powers of the Board of Health).  
257 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  
258 See supra Part IV.B.1.  
259 See, e.g., Aviva Shen, FDA Stalls on Obamacare’s Calorie Labeling Rule to Accommodate 
Special Interests, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2013), 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/03/13/1703541/fda-menu-labeling/?mobile=nc (acknowledging 
that three years after the federal menu labeling law was enacted by Congress under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, “the Food and Drug Administration is still deliberating on the 
extremely thorny issue of how to accommodate various special interests in executing the law,” with 
“[t]he latest delay concern[ing] clashing interests in the restaurant and grocery lobbies, which believe 
they should be exempt from the labeling rules” (emphasis omitted)). 
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bypassed the City Council.  However, as one scholar noted, “[t]he real 
difference between more restrictive trans-fat bans and less restrictive soda 
regulations may be that trans-fat bans do not prompt industry-funded 
opposition to the same degree that regulations of big soda do.”260 
As the New York Court of Appeals noted in Grossman, the argument 
that the Board of Health violated the separation of powers doctrine ignores 
the explicit powers granted to it under the charter and delegated to it by the 
state legislature.  The Board is explicitly granted the power to regulate in 
order to control chronic disease, which it has passionately done in response 
to the obesity epidemic.261  The portion cap rule, like the calorie posting 
regulation, represents the intersection of the Board’s powers to regulate 
food service establishments and to control chronic disease.  The Court of 
Appeals has affirmed that it is the Board of Health’s business to regulate 
such matters, derived from the power granted by the state and city 
charters.262 
B.  Misplaced Reliance on Boreali v. Axelrod 
At the time Boreali v. Axelrod was decided, the state legislature had 
failed to ban smoking in all public places,263 so the state Public Health 
Council (PHC) promulgated a regulation to fill the void.264  The Court of 
Appeals held that the PHC usurped its power as a state administrative 
agency, rendering the regulation at issue invalid.265  The court concluded 
that the PHC violated the separation of powers doctrine under the state 
constitution because the “line between administrative rule-making and 
legislative policy-making . . . [was] transgressed.”266 
The court relied on the presence of four “circumstances” to invalidate 
the regulation.  First, exceptions to the regulation were “based solely upon 
economic and social concerns;” the exemption of bars, convention centers 
and small restaurants from the regulation was not founded upon 
considerations of public health.267  The Court declared that it is “a uniquely 
legislative function,” to “[s]trik[e] the proper balance among health 
                                                                                                                          
260 Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age 
of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 90 (2013). 
261 See supra Part IV.D. 
262 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
263 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (N.Y. 1987).  
264 The regulation “prohibit[ed] smoking in a wide variety of indoor areas that are open to the 
public, including schools, hospitals, auditoriums, food markets, stores, banks, taxicabs and limousines.”  
Id.  It also excluded certain establishments including restaurants with seating capacity fewer than fifty, 
as well as motel and hotel rooms.  Id. 
265 Id. at 1351. 
266 Id. at 1355.  In other words, “the agency stretched [the enabling] statute beyond its 
constitutionally valid reach when it used the statute as a basis for drafting a code embodying its own 
assessment of what public policy ought to be.”  Id. at 1353. 
267 Id. at 1355. 
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concerns, cost and privacy interests.”268  Second, the court considered the 
fact that the PHC “wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive 
set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance.”269  Third, the Court 
determined that the particular circumstances in Boreali warranted 
consideration of the fact that the legislature had repeatedly failed to enact 
legislation, “unable to reach agreement on the goals and methods that 
should govern in resolving a society-wide health problem.”270  Finally, the 
court determined that “no special expertise or technical competence in the 
field of health was involved in the development of the antismoking 
regulations challenged.”271 
The Boreali separation of powers framework should not dictate the 
legality of the portion cap rule, which concerns the relationship between 
the New York City Board of Health and the New York City Council.  The 
Boreali framework fails to account for this unique relationship; notably, 
the New York Court of Appeals has not decided a case employing the 
Boreali analysis to the Board of Health-City Council relationship.  Due to 
the power of the New York City Board of Health, and unlike the 
relationship between the PHC and the state legislature, “[s]triking the 
proper balance among health concerns, cost and privacy interests”272 is not 
“a uniquely legislative function” reserved for the City Council.  The Board 
of Health retains plenary powers of legislation.273  The Board of Health is 
an independent body of health care experts charged with addressing the 
peculiar health needs of the city.274  The commentary available at the time 
of the modern city charter’s adoption elucidates the relationship between 
the Board of Health and City Council; the Board of Health maintains 
quasi-legislative power to promulgate regulations under the health code, 
while the City Council retains power as a legislative body.  In addition, as 
New York’s highest court has acknowledged, local health boards are 
charged with safeguarding the public health.275  Applying the Boreali 
framework to the local level is problematic and flawed; the analysis fails to 
account for the specific role of local boards of health envisioned by the 
state legislature and confirmed by the Court of Appeals.  Judge Tingling 
and the Appellate Division ignored the entire line of case law that confirms 
the broad powers of the Board of Health.  A thorough investigation of the 
intent of the state legislature in empowering the Board of Health was 
                                                                                                                          
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 1356. 
270 Id.  
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 1355. 
273 See supra Part IV.B.1.  
274 See supra Part IV.B.1.  
275 See supra notes 200, 211 and accompanying text (describing cases in which the court has 
charged local health boards with regulating local affairs).  
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notably absent from both opinions.  Instead, the Tingling opinion went 
through a superficial and lengthy history of the city charter, while the 
Appellate Division endeavored to employ only the Boreali analysis.276  
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the Boreali framework does apply 
to the Board of Health and City Council, the four prong analysis would still 
weigh in favor of the portion cap rule’s constitutionality.  The portion cap 
rule was promulgated in response to the obesity epidemic plaguing the 
city.277  As the Board of Health recognized and a growing body of research 
confirms, sugar-sweetened beverages are fueling the obesity epidemic.278  
Therefore, under the first consideration, the portion cap rule was 
promulgated in the name of health considerations.  The “loopholes” of the 
portion cap rule were not fueled by political considerations.  For example, 
the exclusion of alcoholic beverages from the rule resulted from state law 
that preempts the regulation of alcoholic beverages by the Board of Health 
or the City Council.279   
Under the second consideration, the Board of Health maintains the 
broad authority to regulate chronic illness.  The fact that the portion cap 
rule was allegedly enacted on a “clean slate” is irrelevant given the Board’s 
broad plenary powers to legislate.   
In addressing the third Boreali consideration, it must be noted that the 
Board of Health has extraordinary power granted under state law.  The 
Board of Health has historically promulgated rules aiming to decrease the 
incidence of obesity within the city, as illustrated by the menu labeling and 
trans-fat regulations, which have withstood legal challenges.280  The 
Boreali court explicitly noted that given the particular circumstances of the 
case, consideration of the fact that the state legislature had not passed a 
smoking ban in public places was proper.  However, given the balance of 
power between the Board of Health and the City Council, the failure of the 
City Council to pass a law regulating sugar-sweetened beverages should 
not be considered.   
Under the fourth consideration, the Board of Health itself is composed 
of health professionals.  Research by health experts elucidates the 
connection between sugar-sweetened beverage consumption and obesity.  
The portion cap rule is, therefore, grounded in expertise. 
                                                                                                                          
276 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & 
Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D. 3d 1, 7–16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *11–15. 
277 See supra Part III.B.  
278 See supra Part II.  
279 Memorandum of Law for Respondents at 27–28 & n.27, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 
1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013). 
280 See supra Part IV.D.  
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C.  The Regulation Is Not Arbitrary and Capricious 
Although Judge Tingling acknowledged the regulation’s 
reasonableness, he concluded that the “loopholes in [the] Rule effectively 
defeat[ed] [its] stated purpose,” and therefore the regulation was “fraught 
with arbitrary and capricious consequences.”281  Some of the regulation’s 
alleged “loopholes” include the following: it does not apply to grocery 
stores and 7-Elevens; it does not apply to one hundred percent fruit juices 
and beverages that are at least fifty percent milk; and it does not limit self-
service refills.282  However, Judge Tingling’s conclusion that the regulation 
is arbitrary and capricious resulted from an improper judicial review of the 
portion cap rule. 
The regulation’s main objective was to improve the health of residents 
due to the obesity epidemic in the city and curb the incidence of chronic 
conditions that have inevitably followed.  As the Board of Health made 
clear, the increased portions of sugary beverages and coinciding increase in 
caloric intake, by both adults and children, have added to the obesity 
epidemic.283  The link between sugar-sweetened beverages and obesity and 
chronic illnesses is also supported by empirical research.284  The regulation 
cannot reasonably be judged to have been enacted devoid of any 
justification, considering the compelling medical necessity supporting its 
promulgation.  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed that the 
“compelling medical necessity” principle is the proper standard of review 
for a Board of Health action.285  A court should not substitute its own 
judgment for that of the Board of Health. 
The regulation’s alleged “loopholes” are reasonable and do not render 
the regulation arbitrary and capricious.  The portion cap rule “reflects an 
incremental approach to addressing the complex epidemic of obesity, 
consistent with the [Board of Health’s] historic practice of tackling 
complex health problems in a step-wise manner.”286  The fact that sugar-
sweetened beverages are devoid of nutritional value necessitated 
promulgation of the portion cap rule.287  In contrast, one hundred percent 
fruit juices and drinks made predominately with milk are not devoid of 
                                                                                                                          
281 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL 1343607, at *20. 
282 See id. (“It is arbitrary and capricious because it applies to some but not all food 
establishments in the City, it excludes other beverages that have significantly higher concentrations of 
sugar sweeteners and/or calories on suspect grounds, and the loopholes inherent in the Rule, including 
but not limited to no limitations on re-fills, defeat and/or serve to gut the purpose of the Rule.”); supra 
Part III.B (detailing the provisions of the regulation). 
283 See supra Part III.B.  
284 See supra Part II.A. 
285 See supra notes 206, 224 and accompanying text (giving examples of cases in which the court 
upheld laws based on a “compelling medical necessity”).  
286 Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Local Boards of Health et al., supra note 13, at 7–8. 
287 See supra Part III.B. 
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nutritional value.288  Also, grocery stores and 7-Elevens are simply not 
regulated by the Board of Health, and they fall under the regulatory control 
of the State.289  Consistent with the fact that the Board of Health has 
limited jurisdiction, with regulatory power only over those food service 
establishments subject to article 81 of the New York City Health Code, the 
“initial rule is a modest one, to be built on incrementally once it has been 
evaluated.”290 
Self-service refills are not regulated, but neither is the practice of 
consumers purchasing a sixteen ounce soda at one restaurant, then walking 
down the street and purchasing a second sixteen ounce soda to get their 
thirty-two ounce soda fix.  Enforcement of a limit on refills or the number 
of beverages one consumer can purchase at one time from multiple food 
service establishments would be impossible and untenable.  These 
practices are thus outside the purview of the regulation.  Although Judge 
Tingling is within his rights to disagree with the particular terms of the 
regulation, it is not the role of the judiciary to substitute its judgment for 
that of a local board of health intentionally comprised of medical experts.  
According to public health law experts, “[a]lthough the Portion Cap Rule 
does not prevent all industry strategies that encourage people to consume 
excessive quantities of high-calorie beverages, there is every reason to 
anticipate that it will be effective in reducing consumption in the regulated 
restaurants.”291  
VI.  THE LEGALITY OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH’S REGULATION  
UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
In addition to the arguments grounded in state law, there are potential 
legal challenges that may be asserted against the New York Board of 
Health’s portion cap rule under the federal Constitution.292  Two of these 
challenges are addressed below. 
                                                                                                                          
288 Affidavit of Commissioner Farley, supra note 53, at 20. 
289 Memorandum of Law for Respondents, supra note 279, at 27. 
290 Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Local Boards of Health et al., supra note 13, at 11. 
291 Id. at 8.  Consequently, “[t]he Rule should be upheld as a crucial first step towards reducing 
consumption of the high-calorie beverages that are a major contributor to obesity.”  Id.  
292 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Portion Sizes and Beyond—Government’s 
Legal Authority to Regulate Food-Industry Practices, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383, 1384–85 (asserting 
that “[g]overnments have the authority to act in this arena, and though industry may launch legal 
challenges, there does not appear to be a sound basis for that opposition to prevail.”); see also NYC Ban 
on Big Sodas Could Face Legal Test, CRAIN’S (June 14, 2012, 3:53 PM), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120614/RETAIL_APPAREL/120619933 (stating the belief 
of a constitutional law professor at Pace University that the rule may violate the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution). 
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A.  Dormant Commerce Clause 
Under the Commerce Clause, “[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit 
Commerce Clause protection,”293 as Congress has the power to regulate 
“[c]ommerce . . . among the several States.”294  The Commerce Clause, 
“[t]hough phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress . . . has long 
been understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the 
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of 
articles of commerce.”295  The Dormant Commerce Clause applies with 
equal force to municipalities.296  As a threshold matter, sugar-sweetened 
beverages are properly characterized as articles of interstate commerce.   
Under Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the first step of the 
analysis is to determine whether the regulation at issue “regulates 
evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or 
discriminates against interstate commerce.”297  Discrimination manifests as 
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, with 
such treatment benefiting the in-state interests and working to the 
detriment of the out-of-state interests.298  If the regulation is discriminatory, 
it is deemed “virtually per se invalid.”299  If the regulation is 
nondiscriminatory with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, the 
regulation is valid unless the burden is in excess of the “putative local 
benefits.”300   
Here, the regulation is nondiscriminatory, as it actually works to the 
detriment of in-state economic interests; if New Yorkers are willing to 
purchase sugary beverages over sixteen ounces, such business would 
arguably bolster the economic business of New York City restaurants and 
other regulated proprietors.  The regulation only affects businesses within 
the borders of New York City and is “neutral [and] locally focused.”301  In 
                                                                                                                          
293 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978). 
294 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
295 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). 
296 See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 
(1992) (“[O]ur prior cases teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the 
strictures of the Commerce Clause . . . .”). 
297 Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
301 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005) 
(holding that Michigan’s one hundred dollar fee on trucking transactions within the state’s borders did 
not offend the dormant Commerce Clause because it did not “facially discriminate against interstate or 
out-of-state activities,” and applied “evenhandedly to all carries” in the state, and asserting “[n]othing 
in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant 
Commerce Clause”). 
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addition, in contrast to cases where regulations have been struck down as 
striving toward “a presumably legitimate goal . . . achieved by the 
illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national economy,”302 
New York City is not attempting to isolate itself from the national 
economy.   
Notably, the Supreme Court has declared that “incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to 
safeguard the health and safety of its people.”303  The portion cap rule may 
produce some incidental burdens on interstate commerce, as manufacturers 
of sugar-sweetened beverages will not be able to sell their products that are 
over sixteen ounces in the food service establishments subject to the 
regulation.  However, the local benefits of the regulation vastly outweigh 
the incidental burden on interstate commerce.  New York City is facing a 
severe obesity epidemic that negatively affects the health of its residents.  
According to the New York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, fifty-eight percent of adult residents in New York City are either 
overweight or obese.304  In passing the regulation, the Board of Health 
relied on a study revealing that six thousand New Yorkers die annually 
from the health consequences of obesity.305  Considering the alarming rates 
of sugar-sweetened beverage consumption, in combination with the 
established connection between sugary beverage consumption and obesity 
and chronic health problems, the potential local benefits of the portion cap 
rule to the obesity epidemic plaguing New York City are great.  
In addition, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the tendency to treat 
laws of local governments that are not discriminatory on their face with 
more leniency when the locality legislates under its “vested . . . 
responsibility [to] protect[] the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens.”306  The “dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for 
federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local 
government to undertake.”307  It weighs heavily in favor of 
constitutionality that the New York City regulation was enacted pursuant 
to the Board of Health’s legitimate police power. 
                                                                                                                          
302 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). 
303 Id. at 623–24. 
304 Notice of Adoption, supra note 2, at 2. 
305 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
306 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342 
(2007).  The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law at issue against a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge and noted that the ordinance was enacted by the local government’s police power “in an 
effort to address waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern of local government.”  Id. at 347. 
307 Id. at 343. 
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B.  Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Under the Constitution, the ABA could argue that soda drinkers and 
sugary beverage consumers at large are being denied Equal Protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.308  A more likely argument under the 
Equal Protection Clause may be asserted in regard to the food service 
establishments falling under the regulation, specifically small and 
minority-owned businesses.309  However, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged: 
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. 
It simply keeps governmental decision makers from treating 
differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. . . . 
[T]his Court’s cases are clear that, unless a classification 
warrants some form of heightened review because it 
jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on 
the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires only that the classification 
rationally further a legitimate state interest.310 
Here, the regulation neither implicates a suspect classification311 nor 
impinges upon a fundamental right.  Therefore, a court need only conclude 
that the portion cap rule bears a rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental interest.  As acknowledged by the Supreme Court:  
Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.  In areas of 
social and economic policy, a statutory classification that 
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes 
                                                                                                                          
308 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”). 
309 See Memorandum of Law for the N.Y. State Conference of the NAACP & the Hispanic 
Federation as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Petitioners at 7–8, N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic 
Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/2012, 2013 WL 
1343607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013) (asserting that the Board did not consider “those who own and 
operate the small businesses disproportionately affected by this Ban,” and that the regulation “[a]t its 
worst . . . arbitrarily discriminates against citizens and small business owners in African-American and 
Hispanic communities”); Jason Kessler, Groups: NYC Soda Ban Unfair to Small, Minority-Owned 
Businesses, CNN (Jan. 25, 2013, 6:24 AM), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/25/groups-nyc-
soda-ban-unfair-to-small-minority-owned-businesses/ (“New York City’s attempt to keep people from 
fattening up on sugary soft drinks, by banning some of them, would disproportionately hurt small, 
minority-owned businesses, according to the NAACP and the Hispanic Federation.”). 
310 Nordlinger v. Hahn 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).   
311 It is extremely unlikely and borderline absurd to attempt to argue that the food service 
establishments subject to the regulation are a suspect class.  It would be more absurd to suggest sugar-
sweetened beverage consumers are a suspect class under the U.S. Constitution. 
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fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 
for the classification.312 
A court will uphold the validity of a regulation if it “appears that any 
classification which the regulation may involve has a reasonable basis 
within the knowledge and experience of the official body by which it was 
promulgated.”313  The rational basis test is a deferential standard.314  Given 
the “strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional . . . a 
party contending otherwise bears [a] heavy burden.”315 
There is no doubt that the New York City Board of Health has a 
legitimate interest in decreasing the incidence of obesity among its 
citizenry.  A rational relationship exists between restricting the size of 
sugar-sweetened beverages sold in the food service establishments 
regulated by the Board and the goal of decreasing the incidence of obesity 
in the city.  Sugar-sweetened beverages rank as the largest contributor to 
the recent increase in average caloric intake in the city,316 and the 
connection between sugar-sweetened beverage consumption and obesity 
can no longer be ignored.  The fact that grocery stores and 7-Elevens are 
not subject to the regulation does not weigh in favor of concluding that the 
regulation is discriminatory or irrational.317  The Board of Health did not 
have the jurisdictional power to regulate those businesses.318  In addition, 
the Board did not act irrationally merely by addressing the obesity 
                                                                                                                          
312 F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  In addition, “a legislative choice 
is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.”  Id. at 315.  
313 Stracquadanio v. Dep’t of Health of N.Y., 32 N.E.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. 1941).  The court in 
Stracquadanio further stated that the court “may declare such a regulation invalid only in the event that 
it is so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary.”  Id.  
314 See People v. Knox, 903 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (N.Y. 2009) (“The rational basis test is not a 
demanding one.  We have repeatedly quoted the United States Supreme Court’s description of it as ‘a 
paradigm of judicial restraint.’” (quoting Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. at 314)).  The New York 
Court of Appeals, with regard to a Board of Health regulation of milk, declared that: 
If the regulation . . . challenged bears a reasonable relation to a bona fide purpose by 
the Board of Health to safeguard the milk supply of the city of New York as an 
incident to the protection and promotion of public health, then the promulgation of 
the regulation was a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. 
Stracquadanio, 32 N.E.2d at 808. 
315 Knox, 903 N.E.2d at 1154. 
316 See supra text accompanying note 243. 
317 See N.Y.C. Friends of Ferrets v. City of New York, 876 F. Supp. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y.) (“A law 
will not fail to pass constitutional muster under equal protection analysis merely because it contains 
classifications which are underinclusive . . . .”), aff’d, 71 F.3d 405 (2d Cir. 1995). 
318 See supra note 309 (noting that these businesses are regulated by the state). 
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epidemic incrementally.319   
VII. CONCLUSION 
The portion cap rule is a polarizing regulation.  According to a poll 
conducted by the New York Times prior to the passage of the regulation, six 
out of ten New York City residents opposed the regulation, calling it a 
“bad idea.”320  It has also been reported that “[m]embers of virtually every 
major constituency, from Republican politicians to the Daily Show’s Jon 
Stewart, have vociferously objected to the Mayor’s plan.”321  On the other 
side of the debate, according to Linda Gibbs, the Deputy Mayor for Health 
and Human Services, who oversees the City’s Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene:  
People move less and eat more, portion sizes have grown and 
sugary beverages—full of empty calories—have grown 
exponentially and nearly 6,000 New Yorkers are now dying 
each year of obesity-related illness. The question rightly 
becomes not “how dare the government intervene,” but “how 
dare the government fail to intervene?”322 
The portion cap rule is a constitutionally valid and necessary 
amendment to the health code to curb the obesity epidemic in New York 
City.  The Board of Health regulates food service establishments in the 
public interest, not in the name of special interests.  Despite the current and 
potential legal challenges asserted against the portion cap rule, the measure 
                                                                                                                          
319 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[T]he reform may 
take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative mind.  The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, 
neglecting others.” (citation omitted)); Justiana v. Niagara Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 45 F. Supp. 2d 236, 
242–43 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (pertaining to an Equal Protection challenge against a regulation of the 
county Board of Health, the court asserted that “the Board does not act irrationally by addressing the 
problems presented by ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] one step at a time—that is, by restricting 
smoking in some public places rather than others”); see NYC Ban on Big Sodas Could Face Legal Test, 
supra note 292 (indicating that, according to Rick Hills, a professor of law at New York University, 
“[c]ourts . . . have repeatedly ruled that the government can try to eradicate societal ills one step at a 
time”). 
320 Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, 60% in City Oppose Soda Ban, Calling It an 
Overreach by Bloomberg, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A19.  In addition, nearly 
450,000 New Yorkers signed a petition opposing the ban, which was drafted by an advocacy group 
formed immediately after the plan to restrict sugary beverages was announced.  Lindsey Coblentz, 
Shaking up the Soda Industry: Faced with a Ban on Large Sugary Beverages in New York City, the 
Soda Industry Is Looking to Revamp Its Image with Both Consumers and Nutrition Advocates, FOOD 
MANUFACTURING, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 50, 50. 
321 Nathan Sadeghi-Nejad, NYC’s Soda Ban Is a Good Idea, but a Tax Would Be Better, FORBES 
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/natesadeghi/2012/09/13/nycs-soda-ban-is-a-good-idea-
but-a-tax-would-be-better/. 
322 Donya Currie, States in Brief: New York City Bans Large Sugary Drinks, NATION’S HEALTH, 
Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 11, 11. 
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should be upheld as a legal exercise of the Board’s powers.  The Board 
amended the city’s health code pursuant to the broad police power granted 
to it by the state legislature and city charter.  The portion cap rule is an 
assertion of power under the Board’s power to regulate chronic disease 
affecting the city—a power that has been used and upheld before to combat 
obesity.  Increased portion sizes and the role of sugar-sweetened beverages 
in increasing city residents’ caloric intake formed the foundation of the 
Board’s reasoning for the measure.  But above all, the link between sugar-
sweetened beverage consumption and obesity—which in turn increases the 
risk of severe chronic conditions—motivated the promulgation of the 
portion cap rule.  The portion cap rule’s effectiveness and influence on 
other governmental bodies facing the public health crisis of obesity 
remains to be seen. 
